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Abstract 
Land grabbing has rapidly become an important issue in global governance. The recent 
interlinked crises on food, fuel, climate, and finance have increased the importance of 
land governance on the global level, and created a complex and fragmented global land 
governance architecture that involves international institutions, country groups, private 
actors, NGOs, and international peasant organizations. The aim of this thesis is to create 
a deeper understanding of this fragmented architecture by identifying the key 
institutions and relating them to the underlying discourses and coalitions within the 
architecture. An innovative discursive-institutionalist perspective will be used to analyse 
the increasingly fragmented architecture, and to provide new insights into the causes and 
implications of this complex issue area. In addition, critical theory by Cox will be used 
to further understand the observed fragmentation. Ultimately it will be argued that the 
conflictive fragmentation within the global land governance architecture reflects a 
considerable level of discursive contestation in this issue area.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
”Buy land. They’re not making it any more.”   
    
     - Mark Twain 
 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to analyse the nature of the global governance on land 
grabbing. I seek to create a deeper understanding of this architecture by identifying key 
institutions and relating them to underlying discourses and discourse coalitions. In this 
section, the rationale behind this purpose will be introduced, along with the main research 
questions and hypotheses. I argue that land grabbing has developed into a global governance 
problem, that its institutional architecture has become increasingly fragmented, and that an 
innovative discursive-institutional analysis could provide new insights into the causes and 
implications of this institutional complexity on land grabbing.  
 
 
1.1 Land Grabbing as a global governance issue 
 
Land grabbing1 refers to the acquisition or long-term lease of large areas of land by investors 
(De Schutter, 2011, 249). It has recently become an important issue in contemporary global 
governance because it combines the areas of development, investment and food security 
among others. The phenomenon is not new, but the current scale, character, pace, and 
motivators are making the recent wave a peculiar trend. These characteristics are closely tied 
to big changes in production and power relations in the global setting and economy. Land 
grabbing is hence strongly connected to economic globalization, as the growth of trade, 
markets, investment and finance have influenced the increase in land sales. The emergence of 
new actors in global governance such as the BRIC countries, and the new OECD countries, 
and the replacement of the G8 with the G20 are clear indicators of a shifting world order and a 
move towards multipolarity. In addition, one of the main reasons for the increased attention 
on and complex nature of land governance is the emergence of ‘flex crops and commodities’2 
within the international food regime (Borras et al., 2013). As Margulis et al. (2013) argue, 
land grabbing is situated in an “era of advanced capitalism, multiple global crises, and the role 
of new configurations of power and resistance in global governance institutions”. With these 
changes and developments in the background, the recent and interlinked global crises on food, 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 It is recognized here that there arguably exists no uncontested term to label this phenomenon. Rather 
than referring to terms that, while suggesting a neutral approach may have biases of their own (e.g. 
large-scale land acquisition, global land rush), I keep using land grabbing as the most commonly used 
term in the scholarly and policy literature. However, it is acknowledged here that land grabbing is an 
inherently political and historical phenomenon that is related to existing asymmetric power relations.  
2 The term refers to the multiple uses of crops (food, feed, fuel, industrial material), e.g. soya, 
sugarcane, oil palm, corn. 
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fuel, climate and finance have hence created an increasingly complex, polycentric global land 
governance system3 (Borras et al., 2013).  
 
While land grabbing as such is taking place at the local level, the recent growth of 
transnational activities has resulted in what David Held calls ‘new layers of governance’ 
(Held, 2002, 305). With new regional and global organizations emerging, there now exists an 
array of global, regional, and multilateral systems of governance in addition to national 
governments (ibid.). With regard to land grabbing, the character and challenge of this 
agricultural investment trend is beyond state control and coordination alone, and arguably 
requires regional and global governance. As Held and McGrew point out, where there appears 
to be a lesser degree of supreme or regulatory authority, global governance is a relevant 
perspective (Held and McGrew, 2002, 1). This is clearly the case for land grabbing, as land 
governance on local, national and regional levels is alone often insufficient in regulating this 
global phenomenon. Hence the choice of global governance as the level of analysis is 
justified. 
 
Land grabbing is an issue relevant beyond individual state policies and rule making, and the 
need for this phenomenon to be handled on a global level has been rather quickly recognized. 
Without regulation, land grabbing can have negative consequences on human rights and food 
security, as well as rural livelihoods and ecologies (TNI et al., 2012). Hence, land grabbing 
rapidly elevated to the global governance agenda after the linked global crises in 2008, 
resulting in a complicated and fragmented architecture of global rule-making projects 
(Margulis et al. 2013). Compared to the earlier waves of land grabbing, the past few years 
have indicated a significant increase in scale and pace. Estimates vary from World Bank’s 45 
million hectares to Oxfam’s 227 million hectares, with a consensus on the fact that biofuels, 
food and cash crops are major contributors to this global rush for land (World Bank, 2010 & 
Oxfam, 2012). In addition to the scale, low levels of transparency, consultation and respect for 
human rights are often associated with land deals, and hence land grabbing has quickly 
become an issue of world political significance (Zoomers, 2010 & Cotula, 2012). Local and 
transnational resistance has swelled, new global governance instruments are being created, 
and land grabbing is on the agenda of the G8/G20, World Bank, and UN Agencies. Non-
binding laws, rules, norms, and guidelines play an important role in shaping global policy, 
both in relation to state and non-state actors. In addition, the global civil society and 
transnational social movements are mobilizing around the phenomenon, while corporations 
and investors are increasing their global competition for land.  
 
This existing situation well indicates the importance of analyzing land grabbing on the level 
of global governance. It is crucial to do this research in a framework that recognizes the 
variety and multiplicity of actors, influences, initiatives, rules and guidelines that are involved 
in dealing with the phenomenon. Land grabbing is a global-scale phenomenon that is 
occurring in all parts of the world in the context of several interrelated global crises. While 
there is increasing academic literature that examines land grabbing from a local and national 
level perspective (as case studies), and from several different perspectives (food security, 
human rights, political economy, labor, and even increasingly gender relations to name a few), 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
3 The two terms ’global land governance’ and ’global governance of land grabbing’ are synonyms, 
and both broadly used in the scholarly and policy literature. This thesis mostly uses the term global 
land governance, but global governance of land grabbing is also used at times. 
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systematical analyses and theory-based studies of the global level of land grabbing are still 
quite rare. It has been argued that the pace of change in global affairs is accelerating, and 
hence it is important to build on existing studies of global governance to better understand the 
global land governance architecture (Margulis and Porter, 2013, 66). Vice versa, as Margulis 
et al. (2013) argue, contemporary global land grabbing reveals many aspects specific to our 
era of advanced economic globalization. Hence, a broader understanding of power relations 
and political struggles that are in play in global governance institutions and practices dealing 
with land grabbing will be a useful example of understanding the main characteristics of 
global governance in general. 
 
 
1.2 Fragmentation in Global Governance 
 
The global governance architecture for a given issue area in today’s world often involves a 
wide range of different organizations, regimes, principles, norms, regulations and procedures 
(Zelli, 2011, 255-6). While every global governance architecture is different and the degree of 
complexity varies across policy domains, Keohane and Victor (2011) argue that most 
commonly they are arrangements of non-hierarchical and loosely coupled systems of 
institutions. Likewise, Zelli and van Asselt argue that “a core institutional phenomenon and 
challenge in today’s international relations is a growing degree of fragmentation” (Zelli & van 
Asselt, 2013, 1). Fragmentation is defined as a “patchwork of international institutions that are 
different in their character (organizations, regimes, and implicit norms), their constituencies 
(public and private), their spatial scope (from bilateral to global), and their subject matter 
(from specific policy fields to universal concerns)” (Biermann et al, 2009, 16).   
 
It can thus be argued that more or less all areas of today’s international relations are be 
characterized by some degree of institutional fragmentation or, as other authors call this 
phenomenon – regime complexity, polycentricity or complexity (Keohane & Victor, 2011; 
Ostrom, 2010; Oberthür & Stokke, 2011). Although fragmentation on a broader level can to a 
degree be explained as a consequence of the processes of globalization (multipolarity/‘new 
medievalism’), it is not clear what the specific causes and consequences of institutional 
complexity are. It is also not clear why the degree of fragmentation varies across issue areas 
and global governance architectures (Keohane & Victor, 2011, 8). However, as Zelli and van 
Asselt (2013) point out, major gaps exist in the literature on institutional interlinkages and 
complexity. Empirically, the character of fragmentation has so far only been mapped 
systematically for a few issue areas like climate change or forestry (ibid.). Furthermore, more 
theory-driven analyses are needed that explain or understand the more specific causes and 
consequences of institutional complexity, as well as on the variation on the degree of 
fragmentation between different policy domains. More specifically, while scholars have 
begun to adapt traditional approaches, such as neoliberal institutionalism, to the analyses of 
fragmentation, the considerable potential of discourse-based or critical approaches have 
remained mostly unexplored (Zelli & van Asselt, 2013; Keohane & Victor, 2011).  
 
Biermann et al. (2009, 24) point out that institutional fragmentation has crucial implications 
for governance performance and therefore merits more thorough analyses across issue areas. 
The different degrees of fragmentation in policy domains are likely to lead to different 
degrees of governance performance. Biermann and his colleagues discuss the potential 
consequences of fragmentation to governance performance with regards to speed, ambition, 
participation, and equity, arguing that these consequences vary depending on the degree and 
nature of fragmentation (ranging from conflictive to synergistic types of fragmentation) (ibid). 
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While all fragmentation cannot be argued to negatively effect governance performance, 
conflictive fragmentation within a global governance architecture has been found to have this 
impact (ibid).   
 
However, in order to analyse such implications, one first needs to provide a mapping of 
institutional fragmentation for an issue area – and to create a better understanding of 
underlying causes or discourses. This thesis intends to create this understanding for the issue 
area of land grabbing. While the consequences of the fragmented nature of this field are 
clearly important, the scope of this thesis does not allow to go into detail on the consequences 
– especially since a thorough mapping and causal understanding is so far largely absent for 
this policy field. It will instead concentrate on mapping the architecture as well as analyzing 
the underlying causes of it, offering a basis for future research into the consequences of this 
institutional diversity.  
 
1.3 The Global Land Governance Architecture  
 
With regard to the trend of institutional fragmentation in international relations, the global 
land governance architecture is no different. The architecture is strongly fragmented, as it 
involves a variety of different organizations, discourses, principles, norms, and regulations. 
 
 “One of the notable developments that followed public awareness of a global 
 land grab in 2008 was the rapid elevation of land grabbing onto the global 
 governance agenda and a flurry of global rule-making projects at various scales 
 involving a multiplicity of actors to regulate land grabbing” (Margulis et al., 
 2013, 4) 
 
 
From the most notable global governance actors, both the UN system (most actively the Food 
and Agriculture Organization – FAO, and the Committee on World Food Security – CFS) and 
the Bretton Woods institutions (most actively the World Bank) have taken up the issue of land 
grabbing in their work. In addition land grabbing is on the agendas of the G8/G20 summits as 
well as regional institutions such as the European Commission and the African Union. A few 
of the most well known rule-making projects around land grabbing are the UN Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests, and the 
transnational process of developing rules/principles for responsible agricultural investment. In 
addition to these, numerous other projects related to the food crisis and specifically land 
grabbing have been initiated, such as the G8’s ‘New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition’ 
and the World Economic Forum’s ‘Grow Africa’ - initiative, as well as private sustainability 
certification schemes. 
 
The role of non-state actors has also increased in global governance. Private actors play a role 
in governing transnational financial transactions and economic flows, whereas NGOs and 
transnational social movements have also increased their authority through a range of 
activities. NGOs were the first to bring public attention to the global land grab in 2008, and 
have been quick to mobilize transnationally, especially through the Committee on World 
Food Security (CFS) (GRAIN, 2008 & McKeon, 2013). Whereas the main private actors tend 
to side with the G8 and the World Bank, the presence of global civil society in the global 
governance of land grabs is more challenging.  The movements compete with each other on 
the use and implementation of key international governance instruments, and hence engage 
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themselves with several of the existing discourses within the global governance framework 
(Borras et al. 2013).  
 
The role of states in land grabbing also further complicates the global governance framework. 
Land is seen as sovereign territory and hence does not easily fit the idea of a global-scale 
problem. Land and its control has until recently been seen as an issue closely related to state 
practices, and this has been largely internationally recognized (Margulis et al. 2013, 5). 
Hence, while global actors are the drivers of contemporary land grabbing, the importance of 
national legal frameworks is highly important in that they actually make it easier for states to 
facilitate land grabbing (Borras et al, 2013). While land is shifting from sovereign national 
territory to a commodity for the global market, the state is transforming by further engaging in 
the existing transnational processes (Sassen, 2013). 
 
Multilateral institutions are the key sites for the ways of addressing land grabbing, but at least 
so far none of the transnational governance mechanisms developed are legally binding 
international treaties. In addition to this, different actors pick and choose to engage in 
different multilateral institutions to advance their own objectives. As an example, the G8 has 
chosen to support the World Bank in being the leading institution in the governance of land 
grabs, whereas many of the global civil society actors and transnational rural movements have 
chosen to support the FAO and the CFS to serve as a key arena for global land governance.   
 
In sum, it is clear that the global land governance architecture is strongly fragmented. As 
Margulis et al. (2013) point out, the global governance of land grabbing is entangled across 
various types of governance institutions at multiple scales, within which investors, states, 
domestic and global civil society, and transnational, international and regional institutions 
contest land control and authority.  However, these contests go beyond the authority over 
property, as the global governance of land grabbing can be seen to represent a broader contest 
over the norms, discourses and institutions in the new global political economy. The process 
of formulating a new form of global land governance is fluid and complicated, and marked by 
asymmetric power relations between the different actors that are trying to control and 
influence the institutions that govern land.  
 
 
1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
 
Given the above empirical rationale as well as the theoretical gap of discourse-based 
approaches on fragmentation, the main research object of this thesis is to address the dual 
question: 
 
What is the degree of fragmentation of the global land governance 
architecture, and how can this observed degree of fragmentation be 
explained through a discursive analysis? 
 
This question unfolds into the following more specific research questions: 
 
a. What is the degree of fragmentation in the global land governance 
architecture? 
b. Which major discourses constitute this governance architecture?  
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c. How do discourses and institutions relate to each other?  In other words, 
which discourse coalitions – bringing together a discourse or storyline, 
certain actors and institutions – can be identified? 
d. To what extent does the observed fragmentation reflect a contestation 
between the discourses and associated coalitions? 
e. Which discourse coalition is dominant in the fragmented global land 
governance architecture? 
f. Does this dominance reflect expectations about the hegemony of neoliberal 
world order addressed in Robert Cox’s critical theory? 
 
The research will aim to deepen the understanding of global land governance by mapping the 
highly complex and fluid global governance architecture and hence identifying the main 
discourses and discourse coalitions within it. This kind of mapping of a global governance 
field is a necessary starting point for understanding and analyzing the workings of this area, 
and the implications of such a system. As Margulis et al. (2013, 19) argue, the ’dynamics of 
contestation’ will be a crucial aspect in shaping the future of land governance, and that the 
degree to which the complexity of land grabbing will be understood and dealt with will 
determine the future outcomes. Based on the mapping, the main discourses and discourse 
coalitions constituting the different institutions will be identified, along with examining if 
there is a dominant discourse. In answering the question of why the framework is so 
fragmented, the global land governance architecture will also be connected to a broader arena 
of global political economy, and the ideological underpinnings of the different discourses 
within these debates.   
 
Given the theoretical choice, the underlying hypotheses for the following analyses are: 
 
a. The high degree of institutional fragmentation in the global land governance architecture 
reflects a considerable level of discursive contestation in this issue area. 
 
b. Based on Cox’s theory on the hegemonic world order, the dominant discourse coalition can 
be expected to reflect a neoliberal discourse, e.g. preference of market-based self-regulation, 
and concentration on facilitating and enabling investment. 
 
The last research question and the connected second hypothesis will be further developed in 
the theory section, where Cox’s critical theory will be introduced. 
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2 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
 
The theory section first discusses two main concepts that are central to the topic – global 
governance and fragmentation. Discursive Institutionalism is then discussed as a theoretical 
starting point to the analysis, as it arguably provides this research with an innovative dual 
approach in addressing the research problem. This approach will then be complemented with 
a more practical approach. Specifically, the Policy arrangement approach will provide more 
specific tools for the analysis of the research question. In addition a neo-Gramscian theory by 
Cox will be added to further complement the approach.  
 
2.1 Main Concepts 
 
2.1.1 Global Governance 
 
The concept of Global governance provides this research with the overall framework and level 
of analysis. Global governance is a term and concept used to refer to ”the practice of 
governing transborder problems, and to the institutions, rules, actors and ideologies that 
govern the global political economy” (Margulis et al, 2013, 4). From the 1990s onwards both 
academics and the general public have used this term in a variety of ways and meanings, and 
it has hence become a complex term. Among many other definitions, Rosenau and Czempiel 
(1992) refer to global governance as ‘practices of governance without government’, Brand 
(2005) sees it as a ‘discourse’, and Cox (1993) argues it is the ‘institutionalisation of the 
neoliberal globalization project’.  
 
Biermann et al. use the term ‘global governance architecture’ which they define as “the 
overarching system of public and private institutions that are valid or active in a given issue 
area of world politics” (Biermann et al., 2009, 15). This term aptly suits the research by 
combining global governance as well as fragmentation, that will be discussed further in the 
next section. As the goal of this research is to create a better understanding of the fragmented 
global land governance architecture related to land grabbing, it is natural that the concept of 
global governance plays a central role in the analysis. Margulis et al. argue that in order to 
create a clear understanding of the new global rule-making projects around land grabbing, a 
critical approach to global governance is required (Margulis et al., 2013, 4). This consists of 
identifying the actors, interests, and ideologies driving particular governance initiatives. It is 
also important that the international political economy is taken into account, as these 
initiatives arise in this context (Margulis et al. 2013, 5). Hence a theoretical framework is 
needed that provides the tools to both analyse the existing framework and help understand the 
larger context behind it. 
 
2.1.2 Fragmentation  
 
The second central concept – fragmentation, has already been introduced and defined in 
section 1.2 above. Zelli and van Asselt (2013,1) speak of institutional fragmentation, not just 
fragmentation or complexity of regimes, since they follow Keohane’s understanding of 
institutions as a generic term that comprises international regimes, international organizations 
and implicit norms and principles (Keohane, 1989, 3-4). But unlike for Keohane, institutions 
here also include non-state initiatives and actors when analyzing the overall architecture. 
Related to the increasing fragmentation in international relations, it has become evident that 
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international institutions cannot be viewed in isolation, and that their wider institutional 
environment needs to be taken into account (Zelli & van Asselt, 2013, 2).  
 
While Biermann et al.’s concept of fragmentation as a structural characteristic of global 
governance – and as a matter of degree across issue areas - is a conceptual starting point for 
this thesis, there are some shortcomings in their approach that need addressing in my 
analytical framework. First, fragmentation is a concept rather than a theory and hence does 
not provide a full-fledged, theoretical framework. Rather than following Biermann et al. in 
their overall reliance on regime theory and a method of policy analysis, a more complex 
approach is taken in this research. When Biermann et al. discuss fragmentation and its 
possible consequences, the use of theory is limited as a whole, and, more importantly, 
discursive analysis is not used at all. Going beyond Biermann et al., I develop in the following 
sections an approach to fragmentation analysis that builds on discursive and neo-Gramscian 
theories.  
 
2.2. Discursive institutionalism and Policy Arrangement 
Analysis 
 
2.2.1 Discursive institutionalism 
 
According to Maarten Hajer, discourse is an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories 
through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena (Hajer, 1995, 60). 
Discourses4 in the sense of frames and social practices can shape institutional design, and 
contribute to institutional complexity and fragmentation. This is why more than an 
institutional approach is needed for the purposes of this research. For the purposes of 
researching a complex global governance architecture such as the one related to land 
grabbing, discourse analysis has particular strengths; the capacity to reveal the role of 
language in politics and to reveal the embeddedness of language in practice (Hajer & 
Versteeg, 2006, 176). While Discourse analysis is highly useful in analyzing this side of 
institutional complexity, traditional discourse analysis can too easily point at ‘policy change’ 
and assume ‘policy effects’ (Arts & Buizer, 2009; 341). Institutionalism is thus also necessary 
to reach a more nuanced explanation (ibid.). A theory that finds a middle-road between 
discourse and institutional analysis is needed for the purposes of this research. Hence, 
discursive institutionalism is attempting to provide a more dynamic approach to institutional 
change by bringing together aspects from both new institutionalism and discourse theory 
(Schmidt, 2008, 303; Arts & Buizer, 2009, 340).  One of the main interests behind this 
approach is to observe how and to what extent discourses become institutionalized and affect 
social processes and outcomes. 
 
Discursive institutionalism is based on institutional theory and more specifically new 
institutionalism that emerged as a response to an overemphasis on agency without structure. 
Based on this background institutions clearly play a major role in discursive institutionalism. 
In discursive institutionalism institutions are not ‘external-rule-following structures’ but rather 
they are structures and constructs at the same time (Schmidt, 2008, 303). In other words, they 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
4 Norms are mainly used in this research as a reference to broader discourses underlying the spceific political 
discourses. This is related to Robert Cox’s idea of norms, and will be discussed further in section 2.3. 
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are simultaneously treated as a given (as the context within which agents act, speak and 
think), and as contingent (as the outcome of agents’ thoughts, words and actions (Schmidt, 
2008, 314; Arts & Buizer, 2009, 340). Institutions frame the discourse, and the formal 
institutional context plays a major role in determining when and where a discourse may 
succeed, and what forms of discourses are emphasized (Schmidt, 2008, 312-4).  
 
Discursive institutionalism sees discourse as the interactive process of conveying ideas that 
enables agents to change institutions (Schmidt, 2008, 316). Schmidt’s definition is left 
unspecified, and since discourses play such an important role in this research, the definition 
will be further discussed and better conceptualised. Discursive institutionalism takes a 
Foucauldian broad view of discourse that includes social practices, power and institutions. 
According to this view discourses constitute the social reality (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 107) 
and discourse analysis makes it possible to examine the construction of this social reality, as 
well as the conflicts and legitimating processes related to it. As the Foucauldian view of 
discourse will function as a basis for this research, this will be further developed and specified 
based on Martin Hajer’s ideas next when discussing the policy arrangement approach.  
 
While discursive institutionalism provides this research with one part of the theoretical 
framework, there are a few major shortcomings with regards to analyzing the fragmentation of 
the global land governance architecture. First, it lacks clear guidance on method. To account 
for this shortcoming, a more practical version of discursive institutionalism, policy 
arrangement approach is introduced next. While it builds on discursive institutionalism and its 
basic assumptions, the policy arrangement approach enables the analysis of a concrete policy 
field (something that discursive institutionalism would be too abstract for). In addition, since 
the policy arrangement approach builds on the basic premises of discursive institutionalism, 
the problems and limitations of these approaches will be further elaborated on in the next 
section when dealing with the policy arrangement analysis. Second, discursive 
institutionalism does not account for institutional fragmentation. Discursive institutionalism 
so far only looks at one institution and its constitution by one discourse, but this research aims 
to analyse a whole global governance architecture and the causes for this. To account for this 
shortcoming, this thesis expands on Schmidt’s argument. As framed in one of the starting 
hypotheses in section 1.4, it holds that not only single institutions but also entire sets of 
coalitions of institutions are informed by an overarching discourse. This will make the 
analysis about the causes of fragmentation much more nuanced and advanced. Third, 
discursive institutionalism does not account for the dominance of a certain discourse, which 
with regards to the last research question is a shortcoming. The concept for this in discursive 
institutionalism is perhaps too simple, and hence Cox’s theory will come in useful to better 
assess the dominance of certain discourses that underly certain institutional constellations. In 
sum, while discursive institutionalism offers a solid theoretical starting point for the analysis, 
two more theories, along with the concept of fragmentation, will be merged with it to develop 
the analysis further.  
 
2.2.2 Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA) 
 
Like discursive institutionalism, the policy arrangement approach (PAA) tries to find a 
middle-road between discourse and institutional analysis, and shares the same core 
assumptions as discursive institutionalism. It brings discursive institutionalism to the level of 
policy analysis and makes it possible to analyse a concrete policy field (Arts & Buizer, 2009, 
343). Its overall objective is to “analytically link changes in day to day policy practices to 
broader, structural changes in contemporary society” (Liefferink, 2006, 45). In relation to 
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some of the shortcomings of discursive institutionalism, PAA brings in the needed guidance 
in methodological issues and hence is used in this research mainly as a methodological tool. It 
provides a systematic guideline that is compatible with discourse theories, and narrows down 
which aspects to identify and focus on. As Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, 4) argue, theory and 
method are intertwined in discursive approaches, and hence the four dimensions of PAA will 
be briefly introduced here, and discussed in more detail in the methods section. 
 
Four dimensions of PAA - Discourses, actors, rules, and power 
 
As it was already argued before, a policy domain is temporarily shaped in terms of discourses, 
actors, resources and rules. The policy discourses are defined as interpretative schemes that 
range from formal policy concepts and texts to popular narratives and story lines (Arts & 
Buizer, 2009, 343). The second dimension, the actors involved in the policy domain aims to 
identify the relevant actors and their influence in the policy process, and to further group these 
actors together according to their views on the issue at stake (Liefferink, 2006, 51-52). The 
third dimension, the rules of the game within the arrangement, refers to rules in terms of 
formal procedures or as informal rules and ‘routines’ of interaction (Arts & Leroy, 2006, 13). 
Hence, this dimension is strongly connected to the dimension of actors. The first three 
dimensions fit well with Hajer’s idea of discourse coalitions, which consist of storylines, 
actors and practices (Hajer, 1995, 65). These dimensions will hence be analysed together 
when discussing the discourses and discourse coalitions within the global land governance 
framework. The dimension of rules of the game focus on institutions and the ways in which 
they act within the architecture. Hence, these dimensions, and Hajer’s idea of discourse 
coalitions provide the crucial link between discourses and institutions, and makes the 
approach offered by PAA a legitimate method in bringing institutions and discourses together. 
The fourth dimension, the power relations between these actors, will be discussed in relation 
to the earlier ones when analysing the dominant discourse in the architecture. The main idea is 
that actors around a given policy issue are partly dependent on each other for resources, e.g. 
money, information, or political legitimacy (Liefferink, 2006, 54). 
 
These dimensions combine three mainly organizational aspects (actors/coalitions, rules, and 
power) with one substantial one (discourse), and hence illustrates the aim of PAA to capture 
the ideational-organizational duality (Arts & Leroy, 2006, 13). In sum, discursive 
institutionalism provides us with a fitting overall framework and a dual structure in creating a 
nuanced understanding of the fragmented governance architecture.  
 
However, with regards to analyzing the causes behind the fragmented nature of the global 
land governance architecture, a critical approach to global governance is needed. This is 
especially because the possible connection between a specific policy domain and broader 
processes in the contemporary global world will be analysed. In addition, in order to assess 
the dominance of certain discourses that underlie certain institutional constellations, Cox’s 
theory will provide ways to analyse this. Used together, PAA and critical theory will provide 
a broader basis to analyse dominant discourses and the reasons behind their position.  
 
2.3   Critical theory 
 
As was mentioned earlier when discussing the concept of global governance, a critical 
approach to global governance is needed when analyzing the new global governance 
architecture around land grabbing (Margulis et al., 2013, 4). It will be instrumental in 
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identifying the actors, interests and ideologies driving particular governance initiatives, as 
well as connecting these to the broader international political economy context. Critical theory 
stands apart from the prevailing world order and asks how that order came about (Cox, 1986). 
Unlike a problem-solving theory, critical theory does not take power relations and institutions 
for granted but rather calls them into question (Cox, 1986, 208). With regards to this research, 
critical theory is the analytical tool that connects the more specific analysis of one policy 
domain to the larger picture of the whole world order. Ultimately critical theory seeks to 
understand the processes at play that concern both the individual parts and the world order as 
a whole (Cox, 1986, 209). Cox’s approach would also provide great tools for a follow- up 
analysis on how the global land governance architecture has changed over time and whether 
discourses have maintained their positions. However, considering the scope of this research, 
this would be a relevant topic for further research in the future.  
 
2.3.1 Hegemonic World Order and Global Governance 
 
Robert Cox represents a neo-Gramscian understanding of globalization as the hegemonic 
process of neoliberalism. Gramsci’s work concentrated on national hegemony of a dominant 
social class, and Cox expands this notion to world hegemony based on the same 
characteristics. Throughout Cox’s theory, Gramsci’s ideas about the importance of national 
situations are still valid, but a new level has been added as the result of the global economy 
that even all national specificities are dependent upon (Cox, 1999, 11-12). Thus, hegemony at 
the international level is not just an order among states, but instead it is an order within a 
world economy that includes and concerns all states and societies at all levels (Cox, 1993, 61). 
This suggests an increasing complexity, sometimes termed as ‘new medievalism’ (Bull, 1977, 
254 & Rosenau 1992) or ‘new governance’ (Abbott and Snidal, 2009) with a system 
consisting of multiple layers of authority and multiple loyalties. To Cox ‘global governance’ 
indicates control and orientation when there exists no formally legitimated coercive power 
(Cox, 1999, 12). World hegemony is an overarching structure that must include all three 
structures - the social, the economic and the political (Cox, 1993, 61). Furthermore, world 
hegemony is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms that create the 
general rules that support the dominant mode of production (ibid.).  
 
2.3.2 International Organizations – mechanisms of hegemony 
 
The most powerful corporate economic forces, their allies in government and the many 
networks form a ‘nascent global historic bloc’ that propagates the ideology of globalization 
(Cox, 1999, 12).  States mostly function as agencies of the global economy, by adjusting their 
national economic policies and practices to better fit global economic liberalism (ibid.). In 
addition to the states, international organizations play an important role. 
 
 “One mechanism through which the universal norms of a world hegemony are 
 expressed is the international organization. (…) International institutions  embody rules 
 which facilitate the expansion of the dominant economic and social forces but which at 
 the same time permit adjustments to be made by subordinated interests with a minimum 
 of pain.” (Cox, 1993, 62) 
 
International institutions also perform an ideological role by reflecting orientations and 
legitimizing practices favorable to the dominant social and economic forces (Cox, 1993, 62). 
Gramsci’s concept – transformismo – describes this strategy of assimilating potentially 
counter-hegemonic ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition (Cox, 
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1993, 63). According to Cox, the only way a serious counter-hegemonic threat can derive 
from international institutions is if representation in them is firmly based upon an articulate 
challenge to hegemony (ibid).  
 
The role of international organizations according to Cox is related to Steven Bernstein’s work 
on the dominance of neoliberal norms in liberal environmentalism. According to Bernstein, 
the institutions that have developed in response to global environmental problems support 
particular kinds of values and goals, which have important implications for the constraints and 
opportunities to combat the problems in this domain (Bernstein, 2002).  He argues that norms 
are central to all governance structures and that the importance of norms in policy comes from 
their institutionalization (Bernstein, 2002, 2). By using global environmental governance as an 
example, he uses a “socio-evolutionary” explanation, arguing that the framing and 
understanding of appropriate behavior on environmental issues stems from broader neoliberal 
norms/discourses and broader social structures (Bernstein, 2002). As an example he uses the 
sudden growing involvement of UN institutions and especially the World Bank that started 
formulating environmental policies that were viewed as consistent with their broader goals of 
promoting economic growth and liberalization. While Bernstein’s work concentrates on 
global environmental governance, the same processes are arguably at work with regards to 
global land governance, and hence his work on the issue is highly interesting for the purposes 
of this research.  
 
2.3.3 Civil Society – a force of transformation or stabilization? 
 
Gramsci sees civil society as the realm in which existing social order is grounded, and also the 
realm in which a new social order can be founded. While Cox argues that the very notion of 
what constitutes civil society has changed along with the current context, he lines with 
Gramsci’s dual notion of civil society being both shaper and shaped of the world order (Cox, 
1999). In a ‘bottom-up’ sense, civil society provides the ones disadvantaged by globalization 
an arena to raise their voices and seek alternatives (Cox, 1999, 10). The idea of a ‘global civil 
society’ is then the extension of this on a global level where social movements on a world 
scale constitute an alternative world order. This development, in turn, is partly reflected in the 
emergence of transnational institutions that shape the (fragmented) institutional architecture in 
a given issue area. 
 
This fits well with Bernstein’s notion about how in global environmental governance, some 
civil society groups, frustrated with the limited ability of international institutions to address 
the problems in an efficient way, have started more radical forms of oppositions to challenge 
the legitimacy of existing institutions (Bernstein, 2002, 13). Likewise, these new initiatives 
and groups are often directly opposing the broader neoliberal idea of globalization and the 
current norm-complexes behind current policies (ibid.). However, in a ‘top-down’ sense, 
states and corporate interests influence the development of civil society, and hence make it an 
agency for stabilizing the existing world order and enhancing the legitimacy of the status quo 
(Cox, 1999, 11). For the purposes of this research it is important to emphasize one more 
notion by Cox; on a world scale, the nature and condition of civil society is very diverse, and 
is itself a field of power relations (Cox, 1999, 25). From the analysis on the different actors 
and discourses within the global land governance architecture, it will become clear that the 
civil society sector holds within a large variety of positions and views, and plays an important 
role with regards to the different discourses and coalitions. 
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Cox’s critical theory complemented with Bernstein’s work provides a basis for the argument 
behind the second hypothesis. As discussed above, for Cox, the main international institutions 
reflect the broader norms and discourses of neoliberalism in their policies. The second 
hypothesis is based on this expectation, and will be analysed further in chapter 4.  
 
2.3.4 Further rationale for choosing Cox over related approaches 
 
There are other theories on dominant or hegemonic discourses, which I chose not to 
incorporate into my analytical framework. Laclau and Mouffe’s theory on discourse and 
hegemony has its roots in Marxist theory and Gramsci as well as Cox, but both have 
developed further from that. These two theories share several key assumptions regarding 
power and hegemony. They both argue that the main condition of hegemony is the 
unevenness of power relations, and see the goal of hegemony to be the transformation of one 
social group’s demands into universal ones  (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Cox, 1993). 
Notwithstanding the many similar and useful aspects of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, their 
approach barely touches upon international and transnational institutions or upon the agency 
of different discourse coalitions. I therefore regarded a combination of Cox’s theory and PAA 
(and their combined focus on rules and actors) as a more suitable approach for analyzing 
hegemonic discourses in a fragmented institutional architecture. In addition, with regards to 
the second hypothesis, Cox and Bernstein provide a sense of which discourse will likely be 
dominant. While Laclau and Mouffe leave the topic open, Cox’s approach makes clear that 
the neoliberal discourse is expected to dominate (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Cox, 1993). 
 
While Foucault’s approach to theorizing about dominant discourses draws from a different 
theoretical tradition than Cox and Laclau and Mouffe, it may have also been useful here. 
However, Foucault’s theory has such a broad conceptualization of discourse that it becomes 
difficult to make a meaningful distinction between discourses and institutions or discursive 
and non-discursive practices. In sum, it seems that while there are clearly other useful theories 
and approaches that could be made use of here, Cox’s theory provides this research with the 
needed focus on agency, and hence makes it more compatible with the notion of discourse 
coalitions. As discourse analysis is a meaningful part of PAA, and hence discourses will be 
given considerable attention, the combination of PAA with Cox’s theory helps emphasize 
institutions as well.  
 
2.4 Summary and Compatibility of Approaches 
 
2.4.1 Summary of main concepts and theories 
 
Altogether, with the two main concepts of global governance and fragmentation, and the 
theories (discursive institutionalism, policy arrangements approach, and Cox’s critical theory,) 
a full theoretical framework has been created for the analysis of this research.  
 
As global governance can simply be seen as an overarching framework within which this 
research takes place, the concept of fragmentation gets properly combined with discursive 
institutionalism and PAA to develop our approach further. Vice versa, it can be argued that 
discursive institutionalism and PAA bring in new approaches to the concept of fragmentation, 
and the shortcomings that it presents for our research. In addition, a new-Gramscian theory by 
Cox assists in understanding the architecture and the fragmentation. Cox’s critical theory 
together with discursive institutionalism will bring other explanatory variables onto the ones 
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already used in fragmentation literature (e.g. interests and power in the realist sense). In sum, 
while fragmentation provides the conceptual starting point to this research, the two theoretical 
approaches provide more tools to conduct a nuanced and theory-based analysis of the 
fragmented global land governance architecture. 
 
Next, summarizing the three theory approaches that together provide a good framework to 
analyse the research question in a nuanced and balanced way; 
 
1) Discursive institutionalism indicates the relation of discourses and institutions, and hence 
provides a good approach to the duality of discourse and structure.   
2) PAA provides the research with more practical tools for the analysis. A more specific 
definition of discourses is also provided, as well as the concept of discourse coalitions. These 
concepts along with a practical outlook to the analysis make PAA an important part of the 
theoretical framework. 
3)  Cox’s critical approach, along with some additions from Bernstein, helps to further analyse 
the dominant/hegemonic discourses, and the coalitions behind them. In addition, the critical 
approach brings in the broader context that will provide more ways to analyze the causes 
behind fragmentation. 
 
By combining these different theories into a nuanced and broad theoretical framework, this 
research aims to develop an innovative theoretical framework, within which fragmentation 
can be analysed in a different way. It is this combination of theories that arguably provides the 
research with the appropriate framework to provide a nuanced analysis of the existing 
institutional architecture, the underlying discourses and associated coalitions, and the 
hegemonial structure among them.  
 
2.4.2 Compatibility 
 
The compatibility of discursive institutionalism and PAA does not need to be separately 
addressed, as PAA is clearly seen as a strand and a more practical level that represents the 
same ontological and epistemological premises. As it was already discussed with regards to 
discursive institutionalism and PAA, the coupling of structure and agency in one theory is a 
challenge. This dual structure was already discussed, and will be discussed further with 
regards to method.  
 
Notwithstanding some of its more traditional and neo-marxist roots, Cox’s critical theory can 
be combined with an interpretivist epistemology in general and a discursive approach in 
particular. Cox sees the world hegemony expressed in universal norms, institutions and 
mechanisms that create the general rules. For the purposes of this research it could be argued 
that Cox’s universal norms can be likened to the broader discourses in discursive 
institutionalism and PAA. Moreover, as argued above, Cox’s theory can be seen to have a 
dual structure, where both structure and agency affect the observed outcome.  This can be 
brought in line with a similar duality in discursive institutionalism, for discourses and 
institutions (and the coalitions behind them) are mutually constitutive.  
 
Further, the way the two main concepts of global governance and fragmentation are used in 
this research, they can be considered theoretically and epistemologically agnostic, and hence 
are in no fundamental contradiction to the three theoretical approaches. 
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3 Methods 
 
 
The approach in this research is qualitative as it will investigate how and why this specific 
global governance architecture is fragmented. The dependent variable in the research is 
institutional complexity in global land governance. This focus helps to explain5 the 
complicated structures around land grabbing as well as place it in a larger context.  
 
The aim of the analysis is to provide a mapping of the existing global land governance 
architecture, and further analyse the causes for the given nature of the architecture. The first 
step of the analysis will screen the global land governance architecture based on Biermann et 
al.’s typology. The following steps will then focus on understanding the global land 
governance architecture based on discourses, coalitions, rules and power. An analysis on the 
causes leading to such fragmentation will then follow, drawing from the earlier steps. 
Mapping as a method will be based on the dual structure that combines institutions and 
discourses and hence reflects the theoretical basis of Discursive institutionalism and PAA. 
The analysis on the causes of fragmentation will then be mostly based on Cox’s critical 
approach. Through these different steps the attempt is made to answer the two-part research 
question on how and why the global land governance architecture is fragmented. 
 
In sum, four main steps will be taken in mapping the global land governance architecture. 
These steps will combine aspects from the concept of institutional fragmentation, the dual-
structure of the policy arrangements approach, and the critical approach by Cox. 
 
1. Screening the Global Land Governance Architecture 
2. Identifying Discourses and Discourse Coalitions 
3. Identifying the Dominant Discourse Coalition 
4. The Dominant Discourse Coalition and Cox’s idea of neoliberal hegemony 
 
3.1 Screening the Global Land Governance Architecture 
 
First, an institutional screening will be overtaken. This step aims to answer the first research 
question about the degree of fragmentation in the global land governance architecture. The 
screening will identify main institutions and organizations that are currently addressing the 
issue of land grabbing on the global governance arena. The method of screening an 
institutional complex in a particular issue area helps to provide insights into the causes of 
institutional complexity. Screening has proved to be a common analytical response in a 
number of studies on regime complexity (Orsini, 2013). It is the sensible first step of 
analysing an architecture, e.g. to clarify which actors are involved, and how they relate to each 
other.   
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
5 As Wagenaar (2011) points out, interpretivist approaches can also intend to ’explain’, rather than only 
’understand’. Hence, as the main research question indicates, a part of this research aims to indeed explain the 
fragmented nature of  this architecture. 
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The screening will be done according to the typology that Biermann et al. provide for 
assessing the degree of fragmentation. The typology includes three different criteria – 
institutional integration, norm conflicts and actor constellations. However, as the next step of 
the analysis will be looking into actor constellations in more detail, only the first two criteria 
will be used here. The first criterion looks at the degree of institutional integration and degree 
of overlaps between decision-making systems, while the second concentrates on the existence 
and degree of norm conflicts (Biermann et al. 2009). It is important to note that in empirical 
research, these ideal types of fragmentation are not clear-cut, and hence the boundaries 
between them can be fluid (Biermann et al., 2009, 21). The following table will illustrate the 
three different types of fragmentation based on the two criteria used in this research. As was 
mentioned in chapter 1, the different degrees of fragmentation are likely to show different 
degrees of governance performance. The potential consequences of fragmentation to speed, 
ambition, participation, and equity arguably vary depending on the degree and nature of 
fragmentation (ibid). However, in general it seems that while cooperative forms of 
fragmentation can entail both costs and benefits, conflictive fragmentation mostly has harmful 
effects on governance performance (ibid., 31). 
 
Table 1 - Typology of Fragmentation of Governance Architectures 
 
  
Synergistic 
 
Cooperative 
 
 
Conflictive 
 
Institutional 
Integration 
One core institutions, 
with other institutions 
being closely 
integrated 
Core institutions with 
other institutions that 
are loosely integrated 
Different, largely 
unrelated institutions 
 
Norm Conflicts 
Core norms of 
institutions are 
integrated 
Core norms are not 
conflicting 
Core norms conflict 
       Biermann et al., 2009, 19 
 
The scope of this research is limited to the international level, and hence the mapping will not 
be looking at regional and national institutions. However, as the majority of governance 
activity with regards to land grabbing is taking place at the global level, it will provide a quite 
comprehensive mapping of the issue domain at large. The screening will also only look at the 
existing global land governance architecture (consisting of the past five years), instead of 
comparing with earlier situations. 
 
3.2 Identifying Discourses and Discourse Coalitions 
 
Secondly, the discourses and discourse coalitions within the global land governance 
architecture will be analysed. This adds an important level to complement the institutional 
screening, and hence provides a more nuanced analysis of the fragmented architecture. 
Whereas for example Zelli and van Asselt have written about the causes of fragmentation with 
regards to the global environmental governance, this research aims to look at the deeper 
constitutive structures and discourses behind fragmentation. This part of the analysis aims to 
examine which discourses constitute the different institutions, and to what extent the observed 
fragmentation goes back to discourse contestation. The analysis will be based on the first 
three dimensions of the PAA – discourses, actors and rules of the game. As Hajer’s definition 
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of discourse coalitions entails these three dimensions, his work will be also used in this step of 
the analysis. The main emphasis of the discourse analysis part of this research is on discourse 
coalitions. This is based on the fact that the research has an institutional focus and hence 
placing emphasis on coalitions gives sufficient attention to actors in framing discourses and 
interacting with each other through the discourses. This step will be divided into two parts – 
identifying the overarching discourses, and identifying discourse coalitions. As these two 
parts aim to separately answer the second and third research question, together they will aim 
at answering the fourth research question on the extent to which the observed fragmentation 
reflects a contestation between the discourses and associated coalitions. This is also directly 
related to the first hypothesis that claims that the high degree of institutional fragmentation in 
the global land governance architecture reflects a considerable level of discursive contestation 
in this issue area. 
 
3.2.1 Identifying the overarching discourses  
 
The first part will identify the overarching discourses in the global land governance 
architecture, and hence aims to directly answer the second research question. These discourses 
will be further discussed, and closely linked to the discussion about discourse coalitions.  
 
The policy discourses are defined as interpretative schemes that range from formal policy 
concepts and texts to popular narratives and story lines (Arts & Buizer, 2009, 343). PAA, like 
discursive institutionalism is based on a Foucauldian understanding of discourses, but 
developed further. For this research, Hajer’s definition of discourses will be used. According 
to Hajer, discourse is an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is 
given to social and physical phenomena (Hajer, 1995, 60). They entail the norms and values, 
the definitions of problems, and approaches to solutions of the actors involved (Arts & Leroy, 
2006, 13). Hence, discourses give meaning to a policy issue and domain. Discourse is 
perceived as both an outcome and a medium of human action (Hajer, 1995). Hajer argues that 
discourse analysis aims to understand why a particular understanding of a given problem 
gains dominance while other understandings are discredited (ibid). This view focuses on the 
constitutive role of discourse in political processes, and places the discoursing subjects in the 
center of the analysis (Hajer, 1995). In the case of global land governance, just as in many 
other domains, the policy arrangement contains more than one discourse (Arts & Buizer, 
2009, 343). These discourses differ and possibly compete, which causes actors to group 
together in coalitions to “enhance certain discourses and constrain others” (ibid.).  
 
Storylines give the impression of common understanding and seemingly reduce the discursive 
complexity of a problem (Hajer, 1995, 63). By identifying the main storylines, this part will 
map out the problem definitions, approaches to solutions, as well as norms and values of the 
main discourses. Through these aspects, the different central standpoints and responses to land 
grabbing will be discovered. As is pointed out by Liefferink (2006), discourses are relevant at 
two different levels; the first one refers to specific and concrete policy problems at stake, and 
the second one refers to general ideas about the organization of society. The aim is to identify 
the main storylines connected to each discourse coalition by using official policy papers, 
statements, and policy guidelines as the basis for a text analysis. The chosen material will be 
further elaborated on in section 3.2.3. 
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3.2.2 Identifying the main discourse coalitions 
 
The second step will identify the main discourse coalitions. Identifying these coalitions will 
aim to answer the third research question about how discourses and institutions relate. As was 
mentioned before, identifying the discourse coalitions here will complement the institutional 
screening done in the first step. Analysing the coalitions will be based on the first three 
dimensions of PAA - discourses, actors, and rules of the game, or as Hajer would call it – 
storylines, actors, and practices. Hence this part will build on the first part of this step, where 
the main discourses and storylines are identified. Given the institutional focus of this research, 
it is important to identify the discourse coalitions and the actors involved in these. This is 
based on Hajer’s ‘argumentative’ approach that focuses on the constitutive role of discourse in 
political processes and hence allocates a central role to the discoursing subjects (Hajer, 1995, 
58). 
 
First, the discourses connected to each discourse coalition will be identified. This will be done 
based on the previous step that more specifically concentrates on identifying the overarching 
discourses and storylines. Discourses and storylines play an important role in creating the 
coalitions among actors of a given domain as they help simplify the discursive complexity of 
a problem (Hajer, 1995, 63). The actors within these coalitions do not necessary share the 
same ideological or political views, but for various reasons are attracted to the same set of 
storylines (Hajer, 1995, 65). Through the definition of the problem, the political conflict 
appears non-existent within the coalition. In the case of global land governance, the two main 
discourse coalitions identified in this research both consist of a quite heterogeneous group of 
actors with different standpoints. However, certain storylines are shared, and actors within 
these coalitions relate to each other through research, policymaking and political actions. As 
the dimension of storylines is already discussed in the first part of this step, they will be linked 
to the dimensions of actors and rules of the game/practices.  
 
Next, the second dimension of PAA - actors will be considered with regards to the discourse 
coalitions. The aim is to identify the relevant actors involved in the policy domain, as well as 
their influence in the policy process. As this has partly been done in the screening, the aim is 
to complement the first step, and to further group these actors together according to their 
views on the issue at stake (Liefferink, 2006, 51-52). A text analysis of the policy documents 
of the main actors is overtaken to form an idea of the actors involved in each coalition. As the 
range and number of actors is wide, this part will concentrate on the main actors from each 
discourse coalition. It should be noted, that rather than grouping the actors in advocacy 
coalitions based on beliefs, the PAA approach specifically groups the actors based on 
discourses and storylines prevailing within the architecture (ibid.). 
 
As the last part of this step, the third dimension of PAA - the rules of the game will be 
analysed with regards to the discourse coalitions. This dimension refers to mutually agreed 
formal procedures and informal routines of interaction within institutions (Liefferink, 2006, 
56). It fits well with Hajer’s idea of practices. As Hajer argues, discourse coalitions are 
formed if previously independent practices are being actively related to each other, and 
several practices get a meaning in a common political project (Hajer, 1995, 65). Hence, this 
dimension focuses on institutions and the ways in which they act within the architecture. 
Institutions are an important part of discourse coalitions, as they represent the more structured 
way of reproducing a discursive order (Hajer, 1995, 65). With regards to this dimension, 
governance instruments such as the PRAI and the Voluntary Guidelines will be given 
emphasis and attention, as they are arguably the most relevant procedures within the 
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architecture, and have brought together a variety of actors in an effor to govern land grabbing. 
These instruments illustrate the ways in which discourses are institutionalized in practicies 
and policies. They also define the procedures and allocation of resources. 
 
3.2.3 Selection of texts  
 
The analysis on the discourses and discourse coalitions is based on text analysis. This will be 
based on analysis of main documents of the institutions, statements by country coalitions, 
statements by NGOs and industry, and academic analyses on the positions of actors. As this is 
part of the analysis aims only to form a broad understanding of the existing istuation, no 
complex linguistic methods will be used here. This is not needed for the purpose of this study, 
and hence the focus of the analysis of the discourses and discourse coalitions will be on 
vocabulary.  
 
Two sets of documents were chosen for the text analysis. First, key documents and 
publications from the main identified institutions and actors were chosen. The main 
publications addressing land grabbing from the identified main institutions (The World Bank, 
FAO, IFAD) will be used as central documents in the text analysis. These include the two 
main governance instruments, the PRAI and the Voluntary Guidelines that will be especially 
used with regards to the rules of the game. Central documents from the G8, the G20, and the 
G77 will also be used in order to be able to see preferences of these country groups for certain 
institutions. Second, statements from civil society and the industry were chosen. This includes 
statements from NGOs like Oxfam International, and FIAN global peasant movements like La 
Via Campesina, as well as major private actors such as Cargill and Monsanto. Especially 
useful documents are the ‘Dakar Appeal against the land grab’, and ‘Why we Oppose the 
Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment’, as they represent a wide range of actors 
that have grouped together to voice their standing on land grabbing. Again, this will be done 
in an effor to see these actors’ preference for certain institutions. This text analysis is clearly 
not an exhaustive one, and only concentrates on main institutions and a selection of different 
actors that illustrate the range of positions within the architecture. 
 
Central documents of key institutions and actors were scrutinized based on actuality and 
representativeness. This means that there is an articulation of the phenomenon of land 
grabbing through published and up to date statements. Further, institutions and actors are 
assumed to represent the values and the mandate they articulate. 
  
3.3 Identifying the dominant discourse coalition 
 
The third step of the analysis aims to identify the dominant discourse coalition, and hence 
attempts to directly to answer the fifth research question. This step deals with the fourth 
dimension of PAA – the division of resources between the different actors. This is crucially 
linked to the concept of power. The main idea is that actors around a given policy issue are 
partly dependent on each other for resources, e.g. money, information, or political legitimacy 
(Liefferink, 2006, 54). As Arts and Buizer point out, power has to be considered as the ability 
of actors and discourse coalitions to mobilize resources in an effort to reach intended 
outcomes in social systems (Arts & Buizer, 2009, 343). Presumably these outcomes often 
refer to gaining a hegemonic position in a policy arrangement and hence advancing their 
preferred policies.  
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The formation of discourse coalitions is in itself a way to establish discursive hegemony 
among actors with an interest to a specific set of storylines (Hajer, 1995, 44). Through a 
strong discourse coalition, a particular understanding of a given problem gains dominance 
while others are discredited (ibid.). Hajer provides a simple two-step procedure to measure the 
influence of a discourse coalition. The first step is discourse structuration - if it is used widely 
to conceptualize the world (Hajer, 1995, 60). The second step is discourse institutionalization 
– if the discourse has solidified into institutions and organizational practices (ibid.). Based on 
these two criteria, this step will identify and analyse the dominant coalition. Given the space 
limitations, this analysis cannot deliver an exhaustive measuring of the power of each 
coalition. Instead, this is a rather abstract analysis of the coalitions and their resources. The 
next step will further build on the dominant discourse coalition by bringing in Cox’s critical 
theory on the dominance of the neoliberal world order. 
 
3.4 The dominant discourse coalition and Cox’s idea of 
neoliberal hegemony 
 
The fourth step is closely connected to the previous one about identifying the dominant 
discourse. This step will build on the analysis from the previous step and will analyse this 
identified dominant discourse with regards to Cox’s argument on neoliberal dominance. The 
step aims to answer the sixth research question about the dominant discourse being reflective 
of Cox’s expectations about the dominance of a neoliberal world order.  In addition, the 
second hypothesis about the dominant discourse being expected to reflect a neoliberal 
discourse is based on this section of the analysis. The analysis will be based on Cox’s neo-
Gramscian ideas about neoliberalism, world hegemony, and the role of international 
organizations and the civil society in stabilizing or transforming the world order. Hence, the 
global land governance architecture will be linked to broader norms and discourses that 
govern broad global processes.  
 
The broader neoliberal discourse and norms are institutionalized through powerful actors 
(such as the World Bank and the UN agencies) in the architecture, and further formulated into 
a hegemonic discourse (Bernstein, 2002, 2). Through this process the application of neoliberal 
norms and values, as well as favorable practices are facilitated and legitimated (Cox, 1993, 
62). As Bernstein (2002) argues, it is crucial to identify the broader norms and discourses that 
institutions promote in order to understand the global governance architecture. These broader 
norms and the institutions and discourses that embody them ensure that mainly certain kinds 
of policy responses are enabled (Bernstein, 2002, 14).  
 
The purpose of this step is to connect the earlier identified fragmentation and contestations 
within the global land governance architecture into a broader framework. While critical theory 
has a strong institutional focus in explaining hegemony and fragmentation, the analysis on 
discursive tendencies and discourse coalitions will be strongly connected to this. By applying 
critical reflections on the discourses and coalitions of the fragmented architecture, a more 
nuanced perspective will be offered in an effort to answer the overall research question.  
 
3.5 Clarifications and limitations 
 
The four-step analysis that has been described above will aim to answer the main research 
question as well as the six more specific questions. This last section of chapter three will now 
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consider some important aspects of the analysis, as well as the limitations that this research 
has. 
 
 
3.5.1 Land Grabbing 
 
The term ‘land grabbing’ refers to the acquisition or long-term lease of large areas of land by 
investors (De Schutter, 2011, 249). The scale of these sales is not a focus in this research, but 
it has been widely acknowledged that land grabbing is a widespread and escalating trend. The 
investors are assumed to be local elites, TNCs and other states. Again, the focus is not on the 
investors but on the global governance architecture around this trend. As was already noted in 
the introduction, it is recognized here that there arguably exists no uncontested term to label 
this phenomenon. Rather than referring to terms that, while suggesting a neutral approach 
may have biases of their own (e.g. large-scale land acquisition, global land rush), land 
grabbing is used throughout the thesis as the most commonly used term in the scholarly and 
policy literature. However, it is acknowledged here that land grabbing is an inherently 
political and historical phenomenon that is related to existing asymmetric power relations.  
 
3.5.2 Time and Scope 
 
As this is only the preliminary step towards analyzing the fragmentation of the global land 
governance framework from a more systematic and theory-based standpoint, the timeframe 
will be limited to the existing situation. Naturally the developments leading to the existing 
situation will be used as context and background, but the actual mapping will only take into 
account the existing situation. As was mentioned before, Cox’s approach would provide great 
tools to analyzing the change in discourses and their positions over time. This is clearly an 
important aspect to understand and further examine, but considering the scope of this 
research, this aspect would be topical for further research after this initial one. The scope of 
the mapping will also be limited to the international level. It is clear that regional, national and 
local levels have a strong impact on the overall existing situation around land governance, but 
for the purposes of this research, as well as the limited time and scope, this research will 
purely focus on the international level of land governance. In addition, it is clear that the 
issues of land governance reach several other fields too (e.g. agriculture, investment, human 
rights), the land governance architecture will here be limited to institutions, organizations, 
discourses, and instruments directly dealing with the issue of land governance. 
 
3.5.3 Actors  
 
In the time and space given, it is impossible to take into account every actor that is involved in 
the global land governance architecture. For the purposes of our research question, it was 
more important that the main global governance institutions and actors were identified, so that 
they could illustrate the main tendencies and phenomena with regards to fragmentation. 
Hence, what will follow is not an exhaustive mapping of all actors in the field but rather the 
main ones as illustrators of the main groups/coalitions/dominant discourses/guidelines that are 
present. The identified main actors in global land governance are the World Bank, and the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). They are the drivers behind the endeavor to reach 
common global standards in land governance, and are hence central actors for the analysis. 
The main country groups such as the EU, the G8, the G20, and the G77 will also be discussed. 
In addition a range of civil society and private actors such as La Via Campesina, Fian, and 
Oxfam International will be discussed, as they illustrate the variety of different civil society 
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standpoints within the global land governance architecture. In sum, rather than carrying out a 
thorough analysis of the global governance institutions and actors, the focus is on the main 
actors and institutions, and the discourse coalitions between them. 
 
3.5.4 Limitations 
 
Although the theoretical approach combines a focus on both discourses and institutions, the 
main focus of the research is institutional, and discourses are seen as highly relevant in this 
regard too. Hence the part of the analysis that focuses on discourses is not as wide and 
comprehensive as it could be. This is partly due to lack of time and resources. Conducting a 
mapping that takes into account both agency and structure requires both time and scope, and 
in this case both are limited. However, a research that was based on idea of the dual structure 
was preferred and hence some other limitations were necessary. One main limitation is the 
lack of interviews. As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, the analysis of discourses with 
regard to this research will be based solely on text analysis. However, keeping in mind the 
institutional main focus of the research, as well as the time and space limitations, the research 
will still be able to provide a good analysis of the situation, and potentially provide a basis for 
further research.  
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4 Analysis 
 
 
The analysis will be divided into four main steps. The first part focuses on the institutional 
screening of the architecture. The second step will connect this screening to a dicussion about 
the discourses and discourse coalitions based on the first three dimensions of PAA. The next 
step will aim to identify the dominant discourse coalition based on the last dimension of PAA. 
The fourth and last step will then connect the earlier parts that have mapped the architecture to 
a broader framework based on Cox’s critical theory on the dominance of neoliberal world 
order. As a whole, these four steps aim to asnwer the main research question, as well as the 
six more specific research questions.  
 
4.1. Institutional Screening 
 
4.1.1 Identifying the main institutions in global land governance 
 
Land issues on the international agenda have always been contentious. Land reform, and 
especially the nationalization of privately held lands has long been a very ideological and 
politicized battle (Margulis et al., 2013). The World Conference on Agrarian Reform and 
Rural Development (WCARRD) organized by FAO in 1979 can be seen as the one of the 
earliest attempts to establish formal international governance around land issues (fao.org). 
WCARRD was unsuccessful in establishing an international framework for land reform and 
rural development, and with the introduction of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s, 
land issues remained outside international development agendas and lacked international 
interest (McKeon, 2013). It was only after World Bank’s implementation of a market-led 
agrarian reform approach (MLAR) in the 1990s, and especially the ‘Global Campaign for 
Agrarian Reform’ (GCAR) by La Via Campesina and its allies in 1999 as a response to 
MLAR that brought land issues properly on the international level.  This campaign revived 
agrarian reform in the international agenda, and contributed to the organization of the 
International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD) in 2006 by 
FAO (fao.org). The ICARRD formed the basis for international land governance, and made it 
possible for states and rural social movements to articulate a new normative basis for this 
(ICARRD, 2006 & McKeon, 2009). The process for possible voluntary guidelines on land 
tenure started after ICARRD, but finding political consensus on international rules was 
difficult (Margulis et al., 2013, 7). During the early 2000s, the World Bank, the European 
Union, IFAD, and individual countries’ development agencies also passed their own land and 
development policies, already contributing to the fragmentation of the emerging global 
governance.  
 
The global food crisis and the increased international attention on the global land grab (first 
brought to the attention of the media and larger public by GRAIN’s publication ‘Seized’) put 
the topic under the global spotlight (GRAIN, 2008). As Nora McKeon argues, the global food 
crisis revealed a global policy vacuum by pointing out the absence of an inclusive and 
authoritative global body that could deliberate on food issues (McKeon, 2013, 108). Hence, 
after 2008 there has been a heightened sense of urgency around establishing global land 
governance to control the global land grab. To add to the already complex field of issues and 
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actors regarding land grabbing, the recent changes in world order, such as the introduction of 
new players (new OECD countries, BRIC countries), and a shift towards multipolarity 
(replacement of the G8 with the G20), have made the process of establishing global 
governance around the issue ever more complicated (McMichael, 2013). In addition, the 
multiple uses of crops from food, feed, and biofuel are further making the topic complex, and 
difficult to govern (Borras et al., 2013). This in turn has brought a wide range of private actors 
into the field, that are also involved in governance initiatives through international 
insititutions such as the World Bank and IFAD. It is in this interconnected setting of the 
global land grab, broader changes in world order, as well as the global food crisis that the first 
attempts at establishing international rules or instruments for the regulation of land issues 
have been made. So far the most notable global instruments for regulating the global land grab 
are the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respect Rights, Livelihoods 
and Resources (from now on PRAI) that were introduced in 2010, and the Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the 
Context of National Food Security (from now on Voluntary Guidelines) that were introduced 
in 2012. These will both be discussed in more detail in the following sections. In addition to 
these two main instruments, there also exist two private governance instruments that are 
regarded relevant: the Equator Principles (EPs) and the Roundtable Sustainable Biofuels 
(RSB) (EP, 2006 & RSB 2011). However, as in the current situation these two are not 
considered as significant as the Voluntary Guidelines or the PRAI, considerable little attention 
will be paid to these instruments during the analysis.  
 
 In sum, while there have been some attempts to establish global land governance since the 
late 1970s, it is only the past decade that has marked a rapid realization of the importance of 
succeeding in this. The aim now is to make sense of this emerging, yet already fragmented 
global land governance architecture through a dual approach of institutionalism and discourse 
analysis. After this, the architecture will be placed in a broader setting through critical theory 
in examining the causes of fragmentation in more detail.  
 
4.1.2 Assessing the degree of fragmentation of these institutions 
 
Like many other global governance architectures, the global land governance architecture is a 
non-hierarchical and loosely coupled system of institutions, and involves a wide range of 
different organizations, regimes, principles, norms, regulations and procedures (Keohane & 
Victor, 2011; Zelli, 2011, 255-6). Land grabbing rose to the global governance agenda fairly 
quickly after 2008, and ever since has developed into a fragmented and complicated 
architecture involving a multiplicity of actors (Margulis et al, 2013).  
 
The mapping of the global land governance architecture has several steps, and starts off from 
Biermann et al.’s work on fragmentation, and specifically the typology they offer for defining 
the degree of fragmentation of a governance architecture. The next parts following Biermann 
et al.’s typology will complement this initial phase and go into more detail about the 
fragmentation of the land governance architecture. As mentioned earlier, this research uses a 
broader definition of international institutions that comprises international regimes, 
international organizations, implicit norms and principles in order to allow for the inclusion of 
non-state actors and initiatives when analyzing the architecture. The criteria of institutional 
integration and norm conflicts that define the degree of fragmentation will now be discussed 
individually in order to form a more comprehensive idea of the fragmentation of the global 
land governance architecture.  
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a. Institutional integration 
 
With regards to the first criterion, institutional integration, the global land governance 
architecture falls mainly under cooperative fragmentation, as the different institutions and 
decision-making procedures are loosely integrated (Biermann, 2009, 19). The core institutions 
dealing with global land governance are the World Bank and the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO). The two are mutually involved in several governing initiatives and 
guidelines, the most notable of which are the PRAI and the Voluntary Guidelines.  
 
The World Bank, in cooperation with the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD), the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) Introduced the PRAI in 2010, in reaction to the “sharp 
increase in investment involving significant use of agricultural land” (FAO et al., 2010, 1). In 
addition to the actors involved in the formulation of the PRAI, they were also supported by 
the G8 and G20. However, several actors involved in the global governance of land did not 
endorse the PRAI, and even openly opposed them and the World Bank (De Schutter, 2011, 
254 & GCAR, 2010, 2). As many actors found the PRAI to be insufficient in protecting land 
rights and food security, the Voluntary Guidelines were introduced in 2012 through the 
Committee on World Food Security (CFS), and came to be endorsed by a larger number of 
actors across the field (Seufert, 2013). The broader acceptance of the Voluntary Guidelines 
across the architecture compared to the PRAI was clearly a move towards more institutional 
integration across the whole architecture, as there were many actors who refused to endorse 
the PRAI.  
 
In addition to the introduction of the Voluntary Guidelines, the CFS is a specifically important 
forum for better integrating the different actors within the architecture. The CFS is the main 
United Nations forum for reviewing and following up policies concerning world food 
security, and is developing to be the most inclusive global forum deliberating on food security 
issues (fao.org). Hosted annually by the FAO, the CFS brings together an unprecedented 
number and variety of actors, ranging from the World Bank and private actors to international 
and regional peasants movements, some of whom have never previosuly operated in the same 
governance spaces (McKeon, 2013). Although the World Bank’s participation in CFS 
discussions has been said to be hesitant and not very enthusiastic, it is still involved in the 
forum (ibid., 115). The rise in the importance of CFS has certainly contributed to a more 
cooperative nature of the fragmented architecture, and arguably has potential to further 
develop to that direction. As Philip Seufert (2013) argues, through the participation of the 
World Bank, all UN’s member states, as well as an institutionalized participation of a very 
large number of civil society organizations (CSOs), and even private actors, the CFS can be 
regarded as one of the most democratic institutional frameworks for global decision-making 
for international agreements. Hence it can be argued that with regards to institutional 
integration, the global land governance architecture falls mainly under the category of 
cooperative fragmentation. There is certainly at least loose integration between the different 
actors and decision-making processes across the spectrum, and the CFS is certainly enhancing 
this.  
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b. Norm conflicts 
 
The second criterion based on norm conflicts6 is perhaps a more complicated one with regards 
to defining the type of fragmentation this represents. As a basis, all main actors ranging from 
the World Bank to peasant movements recognize that the current trend of land sales does have 
problems and risks that need to be controlled and mitigated. Especially with regards to the 
consequences for the rural population, food security, and the right to food, there is an 
understanding about the possible unfavorable risks of the process (FAO et al., 2010, 9). 
However, any further elaboration on how these risks should be mitigated and which principles 
and rules should be prioritized will reveal several differences and even clear conflicts among 
different actors’ views within the architecture. In sum, it is agreed that regulation is needed, 
but based on what principles this should be done is not agreed on among the range of actors 
within the architecture. The World Bank among many other actors arguably sees the 
continuing investment in land as a priority, and the core principle behind their policies, 
whereas there is a considerable amount of actors that argue that human rights and food 
sovereignty should be the main principles that the whole governance should be based on 
(World Bank, 2010 & Patel, 2009).  
 
The conflict about these principles became apparent shortly after the publication of the PRAI, 
when a range of international and local civil society actors including research institutes, 
international NGOs and academics raised their voices in opposition to the PRAI. Along with a 
few other documents, the ‘Dakar Appeal Against the Land Grab’ from the World Social 
Forum 2011 was supported by more than 500 organizations from around the world (FIAN et 
al., 2011). By the time this document came out, it was becoming apparent that the principles, 
norms and rules according to which the global land governance should fuction are not agreed 
upon across the architecture. While recent developments such as the Voluntary Guidelines, 
along with the annual CFS with an unprecedented number of actors across the board taking 
part in it, are an attempt to bring the actors closer together, it remains clear that norm conflicts 
still exist. The voluntary non-legally binding nature of all existing guidelines and principles 
makes it possible for a variety of actors to be loosely integrated and involved in the same 
decision-making processes while still quite clearly conflicting on the principles and rules each 
actor and institution prioritizes. Hence, while the CFS is an encouraging step in the right 
direction, the global land governance architecture represents conflictive fragmentation when it 
comes to norm conflicts.  
 
In sum, based on Biermann et al.’s typology, the global land governance architecture can be 
seen to border somewhere between conflictive and cooperative fragmentation. Given the 
nature of the CFS and the Voluntary Guidelines, they can certainly be seen as a way towards 
more cooperation, but perhaps are not enough to see the architecture in the light of obvious 
cooperative fragmentation. For the time being, the realities of how this architecture functions 
still strongly indicate conflictive fragmentation, and when looking beyond CFS and Voluntary 
guidelines, a considerable number of conflicts and divides exist.  With regards to governance 
performance, it seems that while cooperative forms of fragmentation can entail both costs and 
benefits, conflictive fragmentation seems to mostly have harmful effects (Biermann et al. 
2009, 31). Hence analyzing the degree of fragmentation and the potential causes for it is a 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
6 It should be noted that Biermann et al.’s concept of norms refers to sets of principles, norms and rules within 
the architecture, and will be used in this institutional screening. This should be not confused with the broader 
notion of norms referring to overarching discourses that Cox and Bernstein use. 
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necessary step in order to analyse the ways in which governance performance can be 
improved. As the research aims to theoretically approach these issues from a dual perspective 
combining institutionalism with discourse analysis, the next sections will examine the 
conflicts and divides of the architecture from a perspective of discourses and discourse 
coalitions. This will further enhance the understanding of the degree of fragmentation. 
 
4.2 Discourses and Discourse Coalitions 
 
Analysing the discourses and discourse coalitions within the global land governance 
architecture adds an important level to the institutional screening, and hence provides a more 
nuanced analysis of the fragmented architecture. This part of the analysis aims to examine 
which discourses and discourse coalitions constitute the architecture. When it comes to the 
contentious issues regarding land grabbing, many of the most debated issues are governance-
related. There is a common understanding across the global land governance architecture that 
some sort of regulation is needed, but what this entails is a much more contested issue. As has 
been pointed out before, there is a multiplicity of initiatives and guidelines around how the 
current rush for land should be governed, there are serious differences between the primary 
positions.  
 
4.2.1 Two overarching discourses 
 
This part will identify the overarching discourses in the global land governance architecture, 
and hence aims to directly answer the second research question. This initial step will identify 
the two overarching discourses and the main storylines that constitute them. By identifying 
the main storylines, this part will map out the problem definitions, approaches to solutions, as 
well as norms and values of the main discourses. Through these aspects, the different central 
standpoints and responses to land grabbing will be discovered. The next part will then connect 
these discourses and storylines to the identified discourse coalitions. 
 
a. Responsible investment - discourse 
 
The responsible investment- discourse is based on the argument that the growing interest in 
land deals is a desirable phenomenon for both states, the corporate sector, and the host 
countries including their whole population (Deininger, 2011). The central point of the main 
storyline is that “Investment to increase productivity of owned-operated smallholder 
agriculture has a very large impact on growth and poverty reduction” (FAO et al., 2010, 1). In 
order for this to be realized the investments must be responsible and respect the rights of 
existing users of land and other resources. This can be ensured through global governance 
instruments such as the PRAI or Voluntary Guidelines. A fundamental assumption behind this 
discouse is that there exist marginal lands that can be made available to address the food-
energy-financial-climate crises (World Bank, 2010). Hence, governance is based on two basic 
assumptions: clear property rights and the functioning of free market forces (Deininger, 
2011). Essentially the storyline asserts that large-scale farming could ensure higher 
productivity, greater production, and efficient land-use. All this would in turn help improve 
food security globally. Hence, the problem definition according to this discourse is not the 
global trend of large-scale land investments, but the risks that can be largely avoided through 
regulation. Using the term ‘large-scale land acquisition’ to describe the phenomenon is in 
itself a part of the position of the discourse. The phenomenon is defined as a neutral and 
technical term that depicts contemporary land grabbing as an apolitical phenomenon.  
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The storyline regarding food security is a central one. The responsible investment - discourse 
states strengthening food security as one of their main goals, and considers large-scale agro-
investment as an important tool to do so (FAO et al, 2010, 7). Food security is seen to contain 
four key elements: availability, access, utilization and stability (FAO et al., 2010, 6). The 
storyline admits to the fact that local food security and malnutrition will not be investors’ key 
concerns, but with instruments such as the PRAI, local populations will benefit from the ways 
investors set up the agricultural production. Further, for these local initiatives to be realized, 
there must be a comparative advantage for the investor (FAO et al., 2010,7). Provision of new 
technology to the local population and smallholder farmers is also seen as crucial in 
improving food security (G8, 2012).  
 
The purpose of regulation to this discourse is to “maximize benefits from large-scale 
investment involving land and related resources” (World Bank, 2010, 96). Facilitating 
recognition of rights, promoting transparency and broad access to relevant information, 
ensuring voluntary land transfers, and complying with minimum standards of environmental 
rights will be enough for these large-scale land investments to be desirable for all actors 
involved (World Bank, 2010, 95). Rule of law, industry best practice, human rights and 
workers’ rights are to be respected by all parties involved in large-scale land investments 
(FAO et al., 2010, 13-14). The governance instruments are seen as a way to form cooperation 
between the public and the private, in a way that the public sector encourages and secures a 
safe and enabling environment for the investors (FAO et al., 2010, 7). Again, as is the case 
with the storyline on food security, the problems as well as solutions are seen as technical and 
administrative issues, rather than political or ideological debates and imbalanced power 
relations between the investors and the local population.  
 
Creating an enabling environment for investment is seen as the most efficient way to benefit 
both the investors and the local population. Hence, the role of the state is seen as a creator of 
an enabling environment for investment (FAO et al., 2010, 7). The central argument here is 
that public benefits arise from successful large-scale agro-investment, and as long as the host 
countries provide an enabling environment, the investments will end up benefiting both sides 
of the deal. The important role of local smallholders in reducing poverty and hunger is also 
emphasized. In order to enhance efficiency, the productivity of these small farms should be 
increased through “more and better investment in agricultural technology, infrastructure, and 
market access” (World Bank, 2010, xiii), as well as transferring land to more productive users 
at low cost (Byamugisha, 2013). Hence, increased productivity based on market access and 
technology are seen as the main ways for poverty reduction and growth. In addition, it is 
argued that “many countries with large amounts of currently uncultivated land suitable for 
cultivation also have large gaps between potential and actual yields” (World Bank, 2010, 
preface). These lands can arguably be put into use in a way that again benefit both the 
investors and the local population. Transforming land into productive farmland through 
private capital, and the role of public sector in promoting investment in agricutlure are seen as 
key goals (OECD, 2010, 26). 
 
b. Human rights - discourse 
 
The human rights- discourse is based on the assumption that the driver for the current 
expansion of production for food, feed, and biofuels is not meant to help the world’s poor and 
hungry, but rather to guarantee further capital accumulation of corporate profit (Borras et al., 
2013, 171). The central argument of the main storyline here is that land grabbing is an 
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inherently political phenomenon, and that the fundamental roots of this need to be questioned. 
Hence, the problem definition does not revolve around control of unintended consequences, 
but rather the whole phenomenon of land grabs is seen as the root of the problem. Technical 
and administrative solutions are seen to be insufficient in addressing a problem that is 
inherently political in nature. The main storyline concentrates on contesting the inevitability 
of these land grabs, and forming a human rights framework as the basis of the global land 
governance. Only by adopting a human rights-based approach to global land governance can 
truly pro-poor outcomes be achieved. Using the term ‘land grab’ is again already a part of this 
discourse and the storylines used. The term refers to something being unfairly taken, and is a 
“cogent reminder of the normative power of discourse and framing” (Margulis et al., 2013, 
16).  
 
The storyline around food sovereignty is arguably among the most important ones when it 
comes to this discourse. It captures the human rights-based approach (especially the human 
rights to food and land), as well as the focus on the complex and specific social relations 
behind each case. The concept of food security has been rejected, as arguably it has evolved to 
be an empty and misleading concept, where the solution for increasing food security is to 
increase agricultural ”productivity” through large-scale intensive agriculture (Oakland 
Institute, 2009,18). Via Campesina defines food sovereignty as  
 
 “the right of each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its 
 basic foods respecting cultural and productive diversity. (…) Food Sovereignty 
 is the precondition to genuine food security.” (Via Campesina, 1996)  
 
According to the human rights discourse, the storyline regarding food security in the 
responsible investment- discourse “captures the notion of hunger not as a deficit of calories, 
but as a violation of a broader set of social, economic, and physical conditions” (Patel, 2012, 
2). Instead of this, food sovereignty focuses on inclusive processes, small farmers’ control and 
ownership of land and methods of production. Arguably, achieving food sovereignty and 
hence, genuine food security, “parliaments and national governments should urgently suspend 
all large-scale land transactions, resign the deals they already signed, return the 
misappropriated land to communities and outlaw land grabbing” (GRAIN, 2011a, 5). The 
discourse sees the economic context, in which for example the PRAI is embedded in, as 
inherently unsustainable, and hence suggests alternatives to achieve sustainable food and 
energy production (FIAN et al., 2011).  
 
Similar to the responsible investment- discourse, this discourse sees global governance 
instruments as well as the role of the state to be highly important in managing the trend. 
However, the framing is radically different, as this discourse deploys these instruments to 
expose, oppose, and stop land grabbing (ibid.). The state’s role is similarly much different 
from the responsible investment - discourse, as the role of the state here is to intervene more 
forcefully on behalf of poor peasants. Enforcing human rights requires binding legal 
instruments that are implemented at the national and international level (FIAN et al. 2011). 
The discourse would hence prefer an international legal framework where the human right to 
food would be recognized and enforced. 
 
Within this overarching discourse there arguably exist a more moderate sub-type of this 
discourse that still sees large-scale land deals as having potential, but more widely recognizes 
the need to mitigate the unwanted negative impacts, and argues for the need for a human 
rights-based approach (Oxfam, 2012). Linking small farmers to the wider markets is the key 
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idea to sufficiently develop the rural sector. This strand of the human rights- discourse also 
sees international governance instruments as the key to governing this phenomenon in the 
intended direction (Borras et al., 2013, 170). However, compared to the responsible 
investment -discourse that mainly just aims to secure the continuation of this trend, this strand 
sees the governance instruments as more urgent and tactical – finding best ways to manage 
this trend currently, in a way that benefits the most actors at once, including the rural poor 
(ibid.). Hence, in terms of principles and priorities, this discourse is wider and more 
heterogeneous than the first discourse, but diverges on many crucial storylines and principles.  
 
4.2.2 Discourse Coalitions 
 
This part will identify the main discourse coalitions and aims to answer the third research 
question about how discourses and institutions relate. Discourse coalitions are connected to 
the notion that actors are actively involved in the production and transformation of discourses 
(Hajer, 1995, 55) As Arts and Buizer point out, actors group together in coalitions to enhance 
the discourse of their preference at the expense of other competing ones (Arts & Buizer, 2009, 
343). In the case of global land governance, the two main coalitions are identified in this 
research that both consist of a quite heterogeneous group of actors with different standpoints. 
However, certain storylines are shared, and actors within these coalitions relate to each other 
through research, policymaking and political actions. The two discourse coalitions will now 
be discussed based on the first three dimensions of PAA – discourses, actors, and rules of the 
game. 
 
a. Responsible investment – discourse coalition  
 
With regards to discourses, the responsible investment- discourse coalition is based on the 
reponsible investment- discourse and storylines discussed above in section 4.2.1. As a whole, 
the responsible investment- discourse coalition is based on the precondition that land grabbing 
is inevitable, and despite the risks involved, all involved participants could majorly benefit 
from investments in land (FAO et al., 2010, 20). The coalition’s definitions and storylines 
have ‘homogenized’ the problem around land grabbing, and narrowed down the wider 
problem field (Hajer, 1995, 54). Hence, through this framing and storylines, the range of 
policy options are delimited, and it appears that the problem field and the debates around it are 
much fewer. The debates about policy become more and more limited to technical and 
administrative issues. The clear focus on investment and enabling market-access for farmers 
conveys a broader message about the way this discourse coalition views development. As 
Hajer argues, “seemingly technical positions conceal normative commitments” (Hajer, 1995, 
55). This is arguably the way in which this coalition, viewing the whole phenomenon through 
technical and administrative lenses presents itself as a pro-poor solution in global land 
governance. The broader normative commitment to neoliberal policies and development 
models can be seen through the positions and storylines of the coalition.  
 
As can be gathered from the sources used when discussing the main storylines of the 
responsible investment – discourse, this discourse coalition consists of a wide range of actors. 
The World Bank, along with strong support from the G8 and the G20, heads the responsible 
investment – coalition. The EU, OECD, IFAD, FAO, major private sector actors such as 
Monsanto and Cargill, many aid donors and some NGOs are also part of this broad and 
powerful coalition that arguably represents the mainstream view when it comes to global land 
governance. Importantly, the majority of the main international institutions side with this 
discourse coalition. The EU, in addition to supporting the PRAI, also further enforces the 
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responsible invesment- discourse through its FDI policy that also arguably emphasizes 
investors’ interests over obligations (FIAN et al., 2012). In addition, the recent developments 
have indicated a new forum with a broad actor-base to be gaining prevalence in the global 
land governance architecture. ‘The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition’ is a G8-led 
group supported by the World Bank, the United Nations World Food Program (WFP), IFAD 
and FAO (G8, 2012). Major private actors such as Cargill and Monsanto have endorsed the 
alliance, and allocated funds for it (Cargill, 2012 & Monsanto, 2012). The alliance consists of 
many of the same actors that take part in the CFS, and even officially recognizes both the 
PRAI and the Voluntary Guidelines (ibid.). However, with the recent launch of a major new 
‘Scaling up Nutrition- initiative’ (SUN) in 2010, it has been argued that there is an attempt to 
direct attention away from the CFS process (Chandrasekaran, 2013). As many of the civil 
society organizations as well as global farmers organizations remain absent from the new 
SUN- initiative, it can be questioned whether this will direct the architecture towards a more 
conflictive fragmentation.  
 
With regards to the rules of the game, the responsible investment- coalition has arguably 
managed to reproduce its discourse in an efficient manner, especially through the PRAI. From 
the main global governance instruments that were discussed before, the PRAI clearly 
represent the storylines of the responsible investment – coalition. The World Bank identifies 
the PRAI with its risk-minimizing mechanisms and industry-led forms of governance as the 
best way to regulate land grabs (World Bank, 2010). As the PRAI have been widely endorsed 
by many of the main actors (World Bank, the G8-led New Alliance for Food Security and 
Nutrition, the G20, the corporate sector and IFAD), who continue to see them as the basis for 
global land governance (G20, 2011 & Stephens, 2013, 190). This guarantees that its 
significance remains high even with the introduction of the Voluntary Guidelines.  
 
So far, all the existing global governance instruments related to land governance are in the 
form of self-regulation initiatives, voluntary guidelines, codes of conduct, principles of 
investment or private certification schemes. The Voluntary way of governing is seen as the 
most effective tool, also with regards to getting investors and private actors to comply with 
the stated guidelines. It is widely accepted within the coalition that mandatory regulations, or 
other similar documents requiring obligatory compliance, are more difficult because 1) they 
will take longer to agree on, 2) they are sometimes diluted as a result, and 3) they are often 
difficult to enforce (IFAD, 2011, 9). The Voluntary Guidelines follow the earlier governance 
instruments in that “(they) do not establish new legally binding obligations or replace existing 
national or international laws, treaties, or agreements”, and hence can be seen as being in line 
with the preferred mode of governance to this coalition (FAO, 2012, 2). 
 
However, the Voluntary Guidelines cannot be seen to clearly represent either of the two 
coalitions. Unlike the PRAI, the majority of actors from both major coalitions have endorsed 
the Voluntary Guidelines. “Even when actors share a specific set of storylines, they might 
interpret the meaning of these storylines rather differently” (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005, 177). 
This notion is arguably very relevant when discussing the global governance instruments, and 
especially the Voluntary Guidelines. There are clearly actors from the Responsible 
investment- coalition that view the Voluntary Guidelines as a highly positive development, 
and see no conflict between them and the storylines they support. Voluntary Guidelines are 
certainly a step towards more cooperative action within the architecture, as it is arguably 
representative of a larger group of actors across different discourses. Notably they also do not 
clearly challenge the claim of the Responsible Investment – coalition that large-scale 
investments in land are essential for development (CSOPNVG, 2012). Hence many actors that 
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identify with the storylines of the Responsible Investment – discourse, and consequently 
largely agree with the PRAI, can be involved in the Voluntary Guidelines process. On the 
other hand, actors like The World Bank and the G8 that have formally endorsed the Voluntary 
Guidelines, have continued their attention and efforts to implement the PRAI as well as new 
initiatives aimed at increased transparency, despite the calls to instead begin implementing the 
Voluntary Guidelines (Stephens, 2013 & FIAN et al., 2013). These are arguably indicators 
that these actors are not interested in attempting to form a more cooperative global land 
governance architecture that cuts through discourse coalitions.  
 
b. Human rights – discourse coalition 
 
With regards to discourses, the human rights – discourse coalition is based on the human 
rights- discourse identified earlier in section 4.2.1. This coalition, similar to the human rights- 
discourse itself – is quite heterogeneous, and smaller sub-types can be identified from this 
broader coalition. As a whole, the discourse coalition opposes the neoliberal, market-driven 
view of global governance and development that the responsible investment- coalition 
inherently promotes. It is argued that “the PRAI give legitimacy to policies that put the 
government and country at the service of large investors (foreign and Domestic)” (GCAR, 
2010, 5). As Künneman and Suarez (2013) argue, the current international responses to land 
grabbing have been insufficient as they only address some aspects of the problem, and focus 
on the land deals themselves, while leaving out crucial human rights-based problems. The 
international policy responses should no longer neglect the underlying economic and political 
drivers of land dispossession. While the responsible investment- coalition has ‘homogenized’ 
the problem and the global discussion to concern weak governance that simply needs to be 
appropriately regulated, the human rights- coalition aims to contest this framing and place the 
phenomenon in a broader context of truly pro-poor development, and true accountability (De 
Schutter, 2011). As the human rights- coalition is certainly less prominent in the current 
global land governance architecture, the recent developments such as the Voluntary 
Guidelines and the CFS might arguably be changing this dynamic.   
 
This coalition consists of a wide and homogenous group of actors. The human rights 
discourse- coalition has clearly emerged as a response to the mainstream/neoliberal views of 
the private actors, country groups (the G8, the G20), and powerful institutions such as the 
World Bank and the UN organizations (IFAD, FAO). As has become clear from the 
documents used to analyse the main storylines of the human rights- discourse, the coalition 
consists of a wide range of actors - NGOs (FIAN, Focus on the Global South, Oxfam 
International), international peasant movements (Via Campesina and their regional allies), and 
various research institutions and think thanks (GRAIN, Oakland Institute, Transnational 
Institute). While the G77 has endorsed the Voluntary Guidelines, the group as a whole has not 
indicated a strong commitment to the human rights- discourse (G77, 2012).   
 
Compared to the responsible investment- coalition, this coalition clearly lacks strong and 
influential international institutions from its actors. While the CFS has certainly increased the 
prominence and influence of this coalition, strong institutions such as the World Bank and 
IFAD arguably still dominate the architecture. However, actors such as Oxfam International 
and FIAN that have more resources than most of the actors within this coalition, arguably 
have more resources, and hence can certainly positively effect the influence of this coalition in 
global governance. The actors, and especially the international rural movements like Via 
Campesina are bringing the voices of local people (small scale farmers, landless people, 
subsistence farmers etc.) on to the global level, in a call to level the playing field. The joint 
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statements such as ’The Dakar Appeal against the land grab’ (joined by over 500 
organizations) and ’Why We Oppose the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment’ 
(jointly published by seven international actors) are an indication of the vast number of actors 
that represent this discourse, and are determined to bring an alternative vision onto the global 
governance debates.  
 
With regards to the rules of the game, the coalition sees the PRAI as irresponsible, 
insufficient, and as being in violation of human rights and international law (GCAR, 2010, 2). 
PRAI “is a move to try to legitimize what is absolutely unacceptable: the long-term corporate 
(foreign and domestic) takeover of rural people’s farmlands” (GRAIN, 2011b, 1). In addition, 
the continuous emphasis on transparency is criticized, as it does not ensure investment deals 
are in any way accountable to the interest of the rural poor (Cotula, 2012). As the Voluntary 
Guidelines are still in their infancy, they are greeted with optimism, especially since they are 
seen to have the potential to remove the monopoly of defining policies away from the World 
Bank, and towards a more heterogeneous actor base (Via Campesina, 2012b, 1&10). Many 
actors within the human rights- coalition such as Oxfam International, Via Campesina, FIAN, 
and Focus on the Global South have openly endorsed and welcomed the Voluntary 
Guidelines, and actively taken part in the process of implementation that is only in its 
beginning phases. Hence, with regards to fragmentation, the CFS and the Voluntary 
Guidelines can be seen as enhancing cooperation between different actors, discursive 
tendencies, and coalitions, but the continued support for PRAI and others are an important 
reminder of the unwillingness of some major actors to move in this direction.  
 
However, the Voluntary Guidelines are still viewed as a major compromise between the 
different discourses, tendencies and coalitions, and hence another insufficient governing tool 
to control land grabbing (Seufert, 2013). Only the implementation and interpretation of them 
will truly indicate which actors they will end up benefiting (TNI, 2012). Once any policies or 
guidelines are passed, they do not self-interpret or self-implement (Franco, 2008). Hence the 
political interaction of the actors involved in land governance will define whether these 
instruments will bring about more cooperative actions towards land governance. The 
vocabulary and concepts used in the Voluntary Guidelines (transparency, accountability, 
consultation etc.) are indeed so broadly endorsed by the large majority of the actors in the 
architecture that the true nature of these guidelines will only be seen after the interpretation. 
The process of interpreting the practical meaning of the guidelines will be highly political and 
strongly contested (Borras et al, 2013, 176).  
 
While the Voluntary Guidelines are seen as a preferred alternative to the PRAI, the actors in 
the coalition argue that enforcing human rights requires binding legal instruments that are 
implemented at the national and international level (FIAN et al. 2011). The coalition would 
like to see an international legal framework where the human right to food as well as the 
human right to land (that has not yet been recognized under international law) would be 
guaranteed, and national governments would bear the greatest responsibility of regulating land 
grabs (FIAN et al, 2011 & Künneman & Suarez, 2013). Applying the human right to land 
would fundamentally challenge the legal doctrines and frameworks that currently govern land, 
and would legally empower many of the local groups trying to defend their land (Künneman 
& Suarez, 2013, 136). In sum, it could be argued that while the Voluntary Guidelines have 
some potential for the enforcement of policies preferred by the human rights- discourse 
coalition, there arguably exist no institutionalized practices that purely represent the goals and 
storylines of this coalition. This clearly weakens this discourse coalition, and the means to 
effect the global governance of land grabbing.  
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4.2.3 Summary of discourse tendencies and discourse coalitions 
 
  Table 2 – Two main discourse coalitions in global land governance 
 
  
Responsible investment 
 
Human Rights 
 
Problem 
Definition 
 
Regulation needed to minimize 
negative consequences of weak 
governance 
 
The whole phenomenon should 
be questioned 
 
Definition of the 
phenomenon 
 
Large-scale land acquisitions 
 
Land Grabbing 
 
Main Concepts 
 
 
Responsibility, Transparency, 
Food security 
 
Accountability, Food 
Sovereignty 
 
Role of Global 
Governance 
 
Facilitating, voluntary, market-
based, technical and 
administrative 
 
Legally binding, human rights 
–based 
 
Role of the State 
 
Supporting, Enabling investment 
 
Main regulator 
 
Broader 
Normative 
Commitments 
 
 
Neoliberalism, market-based 
solutions to global issues 
 
Human rights, pro-poor 
development, strong state 
 
Existing 
Governance 
Instruments 
 
 
PRAI, The Equator Principles, 
Rountable Sustainable Biofuels, 
(Voluntary Guidelines)7 
 
 
 (Voluntary Guidelines) 
Degree of 
Discourse 
Institutionalization 
 
Strong 
 
Weak 
 
Actors and 
Institutions 
 
World Bank, FAO, IFAD, G8, 
G20, EU, UNCTAD, IFPRI, 
Monsanto, Cargill 
 
La Via Campesina, 
Transnational Institute, FIAN, 
Focus on the Global South, 
GRAIN, Oxfam International  
 
This section of the analysis has identified the two overarching discourses as well as the two 
main discourse coalitions that constitute the global land governance architecture. Combining 
this section with the earlier analysis on institutional fragmentation, a more comprehensive 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
7 As the Voluntary Guidelines arguably represents neither of the two discourse coalition, they have been placed 
in brackets for both coalitions. 
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picture of the existing architecture can be formed. It also confirms what the institutional 
screening already indicated; the degree of institutional fragmentation in the global land 
governacne architecture is high, and in many ways conflictive.  
Table 2 sums up the main storylines and positions of the two discourse coalitions, illustrating 
the considerable contestation between the two. The two discourse coalitions do agree on the 
need for global governance, but the contestation regarding problem definitions, solutions and 
governance instruments is considerable. While the discussion around global land governance 
mainly revolves around debating different policy instruments and ways of regulating land 
grabs, an analysis of the main storylines also indicates some deeper divisions based on 
broader normative commitments between the two coalitions. The two discourses derive from 
different ideological and political bases and fundamentally differ on the ways in which land 
grabbing should be dealt with. As was stated in the first hypothesis, the high degree of 
institutional fragmentation in the global land governance architecture arguably reflects this 
broader discursive contestation in this issue area. This will be discussed and anlysed further in 
the following sections that will aim to identify the dominant discourse coalition, and connect 
the global land governance architecture onto a broader setting. 
 
4.3 Power and Resources – Identifying the dominant 
discourse coalition 
 
 
This part of the analysis aims to identify the dominant discourse coalitions, and hence to 
directly answer the fifth research question. As Arts and Buizer (2009) point out, resources, as 
the fourth dimension of the PAA approach, is crucially linked to the concept of power. Power 
is here considered to be the capability of actors/discourse coalitions to gain a hegemonic 
position in a governance architecture and hence be capable to advance their preferred policies 
and their definition of reality. The formation of discourse coalitions is in itself a way to 
establish discursive hegemony among actors with an interest to a specific set of storylines 
(Hajer, 1995, 44). Through a strong discourse coalition, a particular understanding of a given 
problem gains dominance while others are discredited (ibid.). The identified discourse 
coalitions will now be analysed based on Hajer’s two-step procedure to measure the influence 
of each coalition in order to identify which discourse coalition is dominant. 
 
Based on the analysis on the discourses and discourse coalitions, the responsible investment – 
discourse coalition is arguably the hegemonic and dominant one, as both of these conditions 
are satisfied. With regards to discourse structuration, the storylines of the coalition are widely 
used and accepted, and through them the discussion around land governance has largely been 
reduced to discuss the problem of weak governance in global regulation. ‘Large-scale land 
investments’ are seen as inevitable and necessary for development, and win-win scenarios of 
this sort of investments are considered very likely. These global governance storylines are 
also widely affecting regional, national and local governance, as the policies of the World 
Bank and others are implemented through the EU, the G8, aid agencies, and regional 
development banks such as the African Development Bank. Hence the problem definition and 
proposed solutions of this coalition have been successful in delimiting the discussion on 
global land governance issues to the definitions and concepts that their storylines support. 
This is not to say that the problem statements and suggested solutions are not questioned by 
any actors in the architecture, but their discursive power is arguably very strong and storylines 
widely accepted. 
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With regards to discourse institutionalization, it is clear that major institutions such as the 
World Bank, IFAD, and other UN agencies have solidified the discourse in their policies. The 
G8 have “sought to provide the World Bank with the authority to be the leading agent in this 
new sphere of governance, and they have continued to provide it with resources and entrust it 
to manage a spate of new global agricultural development programs” (Margulis et al., 2013, 
9). Clearly the PRAI represent the storylines of the dominant coalition as well, and through 
these policies the discourse can be seen to have fully institutionalized into concrete policies.  
 
The human rights – coalition has emerged as a response and an alternative to the Responsible 
investment – coalition and is attempting to challenge its hegemonic position in global land 
governance. It is clear that the power relations between these two discourses are highly 
asymmetric, with the majority of the leading/dominant international institutions constituting 
the Responsible investment – coalition. The capacities of the human rights - coalition to create 
and control global land governance are much more limited, and so far they have not managed 
to create major institutions or policies that reflect the coalition’s storylines and norms. In 
addition, backdoor lobbying and aggressive media work to influence governance processes is 
used by many private actors, while many of these tactics are out of reach or not accessible for 
the civil society organizations and international farmers organizations (Margulis et al., 2013, 
11). However, the current developments at the CFS, as well as the establishment of the 
Voluntary Guidelines as an alternative to the PRAI are certainly a step forward for the 
coalition. Again, it should be remembered that as such the Voluntary Guidelines are a major 
compromise between the different discourses and institutions within global land governance, 
but the interpretation and implementation of them will indicate which discourse it will end up 
supporting.  
 
As one of the weaknesses of the human rights-coalition is the lack of resources to maintain a 
strong presence in global land governance, maintaining a broad support for the human rights- 
focus within the coalition is very important. As Nora McKeon (2013) argues, during the 
coming years it will be important to find ways to build alliances with resource-rich NGOs, 
without letting them take over the agenda and space from the existing human rights-coalition.  
This is highly topical for the identified sub-sections within the discourse as well as the 
coalition. While it is important for the human rights- coalition to have a broad enough actor 
base that includes these resource-rich NGOs, these sub-sections of the coalition arguably 
border between the two main discourses, and hence it is important to ensure that the main 
storylines are still shared among these actors. In addition, some have argued, that the 
increased complexity that defines current global land governance, will favor less 
structuralized and institutionalized actors and discourse coalitions, and that the global land 
grab might be providing the opportunity for a strong human rights approach (Margulis & 
Porter, 2013; Künneman & Suarez, 2013). This is naturally only one view, and it remains to 
be seen how the global land governance architecture will develop in the coming years. What 
is clear is that the contestation between the different discourse coalitions based on their 
broader normative commitments will continue to take place, and possibly even intensify.  
 
 
4.4 Hegemonic World Order and Global Land Governance 
 
This section will connect the identified fragmentation and contestations within the global land 
governance architecture into a broader framework, and aims to address the last research 
question about whether the dominance of the responsible investment- coalition reflects Cox’s 
  37 
expectations of the hegemony of a neoliberal world order. Critical theory is used here to 
connect the analysis of this domain onto a larger world order. This part of the analysis has a 
clearly structural and institutional focus, that complements the analysis on discourses and 
discourse coalitions. This part is especially closely connected to the previous section (4.3) on 
the dominant discourse coalition. As the focus here is also on power, this analysis based on 
Cox and Bernstein simply contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the fragmented 
architecture and the dominant discourse coalition. 
 
As Bernstein (2002) argues, it is crucial to identify the broader norms that institutions 
promote in order to understand the global governance architecture. While powerful 
institutions such as the World Bank can seen as the starting point for facilitating and 
legitimating the broader norms, cooperation with a wider set of actors further broadens the 
reach of these commitments (Bernstein, 2002, 14). As was argued earlier, the storylines 
identified in connection to the two main discourse coalitions indicate the underlying 
normative commitments. The identified dominant discourse coalition has arguably 
institutionalized and legitimated the broader neoliberal8 norms onto the global land 
governance architecture. Minimal regulation of voluntary nature, market-driven solutions, 
investment-facilitating role of the states are arguably strong indicators of underlying 
neoliberal norm commitments. This answers the last research question, and supports the 
second hypothesis that suggests that the dominant discourse coalition can be expected to 
reflect a neoliberal discourse. 
 
However, given the way neoliberalism is defined here, it is perhaps too simplified to argue 
that the dominant discourse coalition represents purely neoliberal norms. After all, the 
responsible investment- discourse does agree that the global land grab needs to be regulated to 
a degree. One reason for this might be that while only two broad discourse coalitions are 
distiguished in this analysis of the architecture, they become broad categories where 
qualifications and relativizations are necessary. For example, what is understood by one of the 
central concepts of the discourse -  ’reponsible’ – can vary across different actors within the 
same discourse coalition. As was pointed out by Hajer, ”actors (that might perceive their 
position and interest according to widely different discourses) are for various reasons attracted 
to a specific set of storylines” (Hajer, 1995, 65). Hence, the dominant discourse coalition can 
entail a range of different views, some closer to fundamental neoliberal norms, and some less 
so. Another reason for this might be that neoliberal dominance with regards to this 
architecture is better characterized as a ’soft’ neoliberal dominance where some social aspects 
and governance over markets is welcomed. Regardless, the dominant discourse arguably still 
derives from a set of broader neoliberal norms and reflects those values to a degree. Hence, 
the broader dominant norms are relevant here when discussing the possible explanations 
contributing to the fragmentation. 
 
Bernstein notes that in the field of environmental governance, civil society groups, frustrated 
with the capability of international institutions to address the concerns, have created more 
radical forms of opposition to challenge the legitimacy of existing institutions (Bernstein, 
2002, 13). These forms of opposition often directly oppose the broader neoliberal idea of 
globalization and the norm-complexes behind current policies (ibid.) The human rights – 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
8 Neoliberalism refers to a form of market fundamentalism where the market is seen to be morally and practically 
superior to government and any form of political control (Heywood, 2003, 55) 
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discourse coalition is doing clearly this - attempting to disestablish the hegemony of the 
neoliberal responsible investment – discourse coalition. They too have a broader normative 
basis behind their storylines and main concepts. The human rights – basis, the strong 
involvement of states, along with food sovereignty are in clear contradiction with neoliberal 
norms. This counter-hegemonic attitude is captured well by a statement of the ‘Global 
Alliance Against Land Grabbing’: 
 
 “(….) Our Land and identities are not for sale (…) There is no way to attenuate the 
 impact of this economic model and of the power structures that defend it. Those who 
 dare stand up to defend their legitimate rights and survival of their families and 
 communities are beaten, imprisoned and killed. (….) The struggle against land grabbing 
 is a struggle against capitalism.” (Via Campesina, 2012a, 21-22) 
 
It is clear that this discourse coalition is not disagreeing with just the specific policies of the 
responsible investment – discourse coalition, but the whole neoliberal normative basis that 
these policies are built upon. Hence, it seems unlikely that true and deeper cooperation 
between the two main coalitions will arise. As the human rights – discourse coalition mainly 
consists of CSOs, Cox’s view of civil society providing the ones disadvantaged by 
globalization an arena to raise their voices and seek alternatives, applies accurately here (Cox, 
1999,10). This is clearly what the human rights – discourse is doing, and the recent 
developments including the increased attention on the CFS and the Voluntary Guidelines 
instead of the PRAI, are an encouraging sign for the coalition. The role of the PRAI and 
Voluntary Guidelines in legitimating discourses and creating cooperation will be discussed in 
more detail next.  
 
The hegemony of the responsible investment - discourse coalition is arguably further 
broadened through governance instruments such as the PRAI and the Voluntary Guidelines. 
The PRAI has been widely endorsed within the responsible investment – coalition, and hence 
further constructed cooperation between the many actors within the coalition. This has again 
legitimated and spread the broader, underlying norms. The Voluntary Guidelines reach across 
coalitions, and have been endorsed by a significantly broad spectrum of actors from both 
coalitions. While there are many connections to be made between the Voluntary Guidelines 
and the normative neoliberal framework, it cannot be argued that they only represent the 
broader neoliberal norms. Especially with the implementation only being at its early stages, 
and the World Bank showing limited commitments towards this process, it seems like the 
Voluntary Guidelines truly are an instrument that cuts across two discourse coalitions.  
 
However, with regards to Gramsci’s notion of transformismo (assimilating potentially 
counter-hegemonic ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition), it could 
also be argued that the Voluntary Guidelines along with the CFS are a part of the neoliberal 
process of assimilation. As Cox notes; “Hegemony is like a pillow: it absorbs blows and 
sooner or later the would-be assailant will find it comfortable to rest upon” (Cox, 1993, 63). 
Hence, whether UN-based developments of the CFS along with the Voluntary Guidelines are 
evidence of real change towards a more cooperative global land governance architecture 
across discourse coalitions (and hence a less hegemonic coalition), or a hegemonic 
mechanism, arguably remains to be seen. Connected to this is Cox’s notion of civil society as 
being both the shaper and shaped of the world order (Cox, 1999). As much of the CSOs are 
deeply rooted in the normative commitments of the human rights- discourse coalition, it is in 
fact CSOs (mainly NGOs) that largely construct the sub-type of the human rights- discourse 
that is arguably quite fluid. Whether these actors will end up becoming an agency for 
stabilizing and legitimizing the hegemonic neoliberal norms, or an agency for supporting the 
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counter-hegemonic voices of the human rights – coalition is arguably still unclear (Cox, 1999, 
10-11). 
 
In sum, it can be argued that the two main coalitions have their foundations in broader 
normative frameworks that are conflicting. Further, answering the last research question and 
supporting the second hypothesis, it seems that the dominant Responsible investment – 
coalition derives its basis from norms based on neoliberal values such as market-based 
solutions and self-regulation. The norm conflicts and contestations between the two coalitions 
are clearly visible in the architecture with multiple forums, actor constellations, decision-
making bodies, and most clearly the governing instruments. This connects back to the first 
hypothesis discussed earlier in section 4.2.3, that asserted that the high degree of institutional 
fragmentation reflects a considerable level of discursive contestation in this issue area. Here 
the discursive contestation specifically refers to the deeper discourses that Cox sees as 
universal norms. Each coalition on a broader level acts according to these norms, that on a 
fundamental level are conflicting, and hence are reflected in the high degree of institutional 
fragmentation. While the CFS and the Voluntary Guidelines are taken as a positive 
development with regards to further cooperation across the architecture, the norm conflicts are 
arguably so significant that true and deep cooperation, and for example the establishments of 
legally binding governance instruments, seem unlikely. These norm-based reasons for the 
conflictive fragmentation of the global land governance architecture are difficult to overcome 
in order to transform the architecture towards a more cooperative manner. As was argued by 
Biermann et al. (2009), the governance performance of a given architecture is harmed where 
conflictive fragmentation is present. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
5.1 Summary and Findings 
 
The aim of the research was to deepen the understanding of the nature of global land 
governance and the contestations that exist within this architecture. The main research 
question was dual in nature, aiming to analyse the degree of fragmentation of the global land 
governance architecture, as well as to explain this degree of fragmentation through a 
discursive analysis. Understanding the reasons behind fragmentation are important in being 
able to analyse the consequences for this, as well as the possibilities of responding to such 
fragmentation. Through the discursive institutionalist analysis the architecture was mapped 
through identifying the main institutions and discussing the discourses and discourse 
coalitions related to them. This was then connected to Cox’s critical theory with the aim to 
understand the underlying normative commitments behind the coalitions in the fragmented 
architecture. The theoretical framework created for this research aimed to provide a new 
innovative way to analyse the fragmentation and further understand the global land 
governance architecture. 
 
Through the initial institutional screening it was discovered that the global land governance is 
an architecture of high and conflictive fragmentation, which directly answers the first 
research question about the degree of fragmentation. It was also argued that as a consequence, 
the governance efficiency of this architecture might be negatively effected by this. This partly 
also answers the main research question. As was noted in the introduction, as well as in 
section 4.1.1, the issue area of land grabbing is complex, and cuts across a variety of areas 
from development and investment to human rights and agriculture. In addition, the emergence 
of ’flex crops and commodities’ within the international food regime connected to the recent 
interlinked global crises on food, fuel, climate and finance is increasingly contributing to the 
complexity of the architecture governing the global land grab. While these underlying 
circumstances are arguably contributing to the fragmentation of the architecture, a deeper 
analysis of the discourses and institutions was needed to better understand the fragmentation, 
and especially the conflictive nature of it.  
 
Through the first three dimensions of PAA – discourses, actors, and rules of the game, – the 
aim was to better understand the observed conflictive fragmentation. With regards to the 
second research question, the responsible investment – discourse and the human rights – 
discourse were identified as the main overarching discourses within the architecture. With 
regards to the third research question, these discourses were seen to be reflected in two 
discourse coalitions both consisting of a wide range of actors and institutions.  Through the 
storylines connected to these coalitions, some broader normative commitments behind these 
coalitions were also identified. With regards to the fourth research question about the extent 
to which the observed fragmentation reflects a contestation between the discourses and 
associated coalitions, this part of the analysis provided some insights. Table 2 in section 4.2.3 
illustrates the clear conflicts between the discourses and associated coalitions based some of 
the main issues at stake (problem definitions, approaches to solutions, broader normative 
commitment and values of the main discourses), and hence can be seen reflect conflictive 
fragmentation. These findings are in line with the first hypothesis that expected to see the high 
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degree of fragmentation in the architecture to reflect a considerable level of discursive 
contestation in this issue area. In sum, by identifying the discourses and discourse coalitions, a 
better and more nuanced understanding of the fragmented architecture could be formed.  
 
A further analysis of these two coalitions with regards to resources and power provided an 
answer to the fifth research question about the dominant discourse coalition. The analysis 
indicated that the responsible investment – discourse coalition with the backing of most of the 
main international institutions is the dominant coalition with most influence and resources in 
global land governance. In addition to the factors pointing to this from the analysis of the 
storylines, actors and rules of the game, the two-step procedure based on discourse 
structuration and institutionalization indicated towards the dominance of the responsible 
investment – coalition. This aspect was further connected to Cox’s critical theory in an effort 
to link the global land governance architecture to a broader setting and overarching 
discourses. After discussing Cox’s and Bernstein’s ideas of the hegemonic world order, and 
the role of international institutions in spreading this broader neoliberal discourse, it was 
argued that the dominance of the responsible investment – discourse could be seen to reflect 
Cox’s expectiations, and hence the last research question was addressed. This was in line with 
the second hypothesis that expected to see the dominant discourse coalition reflecting a 
broader neoliberal discourse. However, as was discussed in more detail in section 4.4, the 
responsible investment- coalition cannot be seen to reflect purely neoliberal values, as the 
coalition agrees to the necessity to control land grabbing to a degree. With this notion in mind, 
the observed connection between broader neoliberal discourses and the dominant discourse 
coalition arguably still adds to the understanding about why the architecture is highly 
fragmented. Especially with regards to understanding the conflictive nature of the 
fragmentation, the neoliberal basis of the dominant coalition will arguably make it highly 
unlikely for the two coalitions to find a truly cooperative way of governing the global land 
grab. 
 
In sum, the overarching research question about the degree of fragmentation and the ways in 
which this can be explained through a discursive analysis has been answered through the more 
specific research questions throughout the analysis. Through a discursive institutionalist- 
approach this thesis aimed to provide a nuanced analysis of the existing global land 
governance architecture, and the reasons contributing to the observed conflictive 
fragmentation. It has been discovered that the degree and nature of fragmentation with regards 
to this architecture is high and conflictive. The reasons for this are arguably complex, but the 
analysis of the main discourse coalitions provided some insights of the potential reasons for 
this. Along with the conflictive ideas on the policy level, the deeper normative commitments 
arguably add on to the conflict. Bringing in Cox’s critical theory and connecting the 
discussion onto a broader arena of global political economy, a broader understanding of the 
possible reasons contibuting to conflictive fragmentation were discovered. Clearly the fact 
that so many different aspects were analysed made this research only a broad overview about 
the existing situation. However, given the dual focus on both institutions and discourses, this 
research has provided an approach that takes into account a broad range of factors in one 
analysis.  
 
5.2 Limitations 
 
Given the time and scope of this research, the different aspects and parts that contibuted to the 
analysis were all limted in their depth. The institutional screening, along with the different 
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parts of analysing the discourse coalitions were all limited. Arguably this research could be 
seen as an overview, where all parts could be analysed more in-depth in a broader research. In 
addition, only the main discourses and discourse coalitions were identified, whereas there 
would arguably be many discourse tendencies and nuances within these broader groupings. 
For the purposes of this research, it was however useful to identify the overaching and major 
discourses and coalitions. Likewise, concentrating mostly on the major actors and institutions 
meant that the analysis on the dimension of actors was limited. Especially with regards to 
different country-positions as well as non-state actors and the private sector, a more extensive 
analysis of these could certainly be useful. Perhaps the single most significant limitation of 
this research is the reliance on text analysis only, when analysing the different discourses and 
coalitions. As was discussed before in section 3.4, interviews are an important aspect of 
conducting an in-depth discourse analysis, and the lack of them is certainly a limitation. 
Again, as the scope and time of this thesis was very limited, the preference was to provide an 
analysis based on several different aspects and factors, rather than concentrate solely on 
discourse analysis. Adding interviews to this research would hence centrainly create a deeper 
understanding of the different views represented. 
 
5.3 Suggestions for further research 
 
With regards to further researching fragmentation and the global land governance 
architecture, one clear suggestion for further research would be to analyse the consequences 
of the observed conflictive fragmentation for global land governance. Zelli and van Asselt 
(2013) discuss the consequences of fragmentation with regards to global environmental 
governance, and Orsini (2013) specifically addresses consequences of fragmentation with 
regards to different kinds of actors in forestry and access to genetic resources. This kind of 
further research with regards to global land governance would arguably provide valuable 
insights into how fragmentation should be understood and dealt with in this specific 
architecture. In addition, further research on how fragmentation can and should be dealt with 
would be arguably very valuable.  
 
Another interesting aspect for further research would be to look into the ways in which the 
architecture, and the nature of fragmentation have changed. The change in the way in which 
the discourses have evolved, and the way in which different institutions and actors have been 
positioned over the course of time, would arguably provide useful insights as to the current 
situation. Both Discursive institionalism (along with PAA) and Cox’s critical theory provide a 
great basis for analysing the aspect of change, and hence this would be a good continuation of 
the existing research on the current situation. For example, Arts and Buizer (2009) used PAA 
to analyse discursive change and continuity in global forest governance. 
 
Further, connecting the analysis of the global level to regional, national, and local levels 
would arguably be useful. Land grabbing is an issue of high importance on all levels of 
governance, and all levels are connected to and affected by the way land grabbing is governed 
on a global level. Hence, understanding how and to what degree this observed conflictive 
fragmentation and discourse coalitions are reflected on the other levels of land governance 
would again provide a more nuanced understanding of all the different aspects and issues at 
stake.  
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